ANS Nuclear Cafe

By Leslie Corrice

There was considerable concern within the nuclear energy community about Michael Mann’s cyber-thriller Blackhat before its release. Much of the pre-release angst was generated by the trailers, which showed a catastrophic nuclear accident had blown open a gaping hole in a large, domed containment building. I went to see it the first day it hit the local cinema, and early on I suspected that the nuclear energy community’s angst was literally much ado about nearly nothing.

My first inkling was early on, when the control room was shown. I almost laughed because it had wall-to-wall windows overlooking a vast, steaming open pool of water. First-off, there are no windows in actual nuclear power plant control rooms. Also, the depicted control room looked much like a high-tech Press Box at a modern professional football stadium. Regardless, I was curious about the hot-water pool. I wondered if that was supposed to be the reactor. My speculation was soon verified. There was a series of long, vertical metal pipes deep within the pool—the supposed core. Surrounding these pipes were several rotating fan-like devices. It seems that these were supposed to be the circulation pumps.

After a brief computer-graphic depiction of a malware bug invading the fantasy plant’s computer system, the fans speed up and fly apart. The metal pipes immediately begin to get red from massive heat generation and…well…it gets so bad that there’s an explosion that blows open the domed containment, a la Chernobyl.

It’s Hollywood, folks. There is literally nothing real-world about the nuke in the flick. It doesn’t matter that all nuclear power plant control room operating systems are not connected to the internet. It doesn’t matter that a massive power surge generating cataclysmic heat generation is only possible in units having a positive reactivity coefficient (Chernobyl, again). What matters is that this is purely the fabrication of creative Hollywood minds doing their best to exploit public fears about nukes spawned by skewed Press and internet reports concerning the Fukushima Accident. It is a pure fiction.

There’s a lot more to nit-pick over concerning the nuclear plant in Blackhat, but as a colleague writes, “This has so much wrong in the depiction of a nuclear power plant accident that it may not be useful to do a detailed rebuttal.” I agree whole-heartedly because, again, it is much ado about nearly nothing.

My earlier career in nuclear energy included operations at both boiling and pressurized water nukes, but my specialty was health physics. One nit I do wish to relate concerns my understanding of radiation exposure. Before the cast enters the control room to retrieve a key hard drive, they are told the radiation level is 1,000 microsieverts per hour and the temperature was 130 ^oF. Thus, they could not stay in there more than eight minutes. One member of the team succumbs in less than five minutes. Was it from the heat, or the radiation? We never find out, but the implication that he was overcome by the radiation is pretty strong. Actual medically-observable adverse effects do not occur at a little over 13 millisieverts exposure. In fact, nothing like that has ever happened with exposures ten times greater, or even 50 times greater.

In my opinion, here’s the bottom line. The script was written to appeal to the movie-going audience. Most of the public is willing to believe a nuclear power plant accident of the depicted magnitude is possible. This is why I say that pre-release concerns were much ado about nearly nothing. The movie appeals to the public’s nuclear power plant naivety and reinforces Fukushima-spawned fears, which is something worth considering.

Leslie Corrice spent 21 years in the nuclear field in health physics. He publishes the Hiroshima Syndrome website and posts two blogs: Fukushima Updates and Fukushima Commentary.

An International Forum for the Discussion of Advances, Challenges and Learning

By Will Davis

There was a time in our not too distant past when a brochure such as that above—entitled “Yankee Ingenuity,” and published in 1982 by the Nuclear Information Committee of the Electric Council of New England—carried a message that rang true. The imagery of the mill house, as an early cornerstone of commerce employed widely across New England, was coupled with the image of a nuclear power plant. The Northeast had a tendency for doing what was necessary to advance commerce and break away from foreign control. In short, it was the “Yankee spirit.”

It was in that corner of the United States that the breakaway from England launched; it was, decades later, in that corner too that the people found themselves almost completely at the mercy of oil prices for their electric power generation—prices also under foreign control. Starting with the legendary Yankee Atomic Electric Company plant at Rowe, Mass., the Northeast planned and built a range of nuclear plants to diversify its fuel mix and wrest away control of its electric power pricing from outside interests.

One of these plants, seen above from the brochure, was Vermont Yankee. Ordered in 1966 by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (itself owned by Central Vermont Public Service, Green Mountain Power, New England Power, Northeast Utilities, Central Maine Power, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, Cambridge Electric Light, Eastern Utilities Associates, Burlington Electric Dept., Lyndonville Electric Dept., Vermont Electric Coop., Inc., and Washington Electric Co-op, Inc.), the plant went up quickly. The reactor achieved initial criticality on March 24, 1972, and the plant produced its first electric power on September 20, 1972. It was declared to be in commercial operation the following November.

I use the term “was,” because on Monday, December 29, 2014, Vermont Yankee disconnected from the grid at 12:12 PM. The reactor was shut down for the last time at 1:04 PM the same day. The plant follows a number of the Northeast U.S. nuclear plants into shutdown and decommissioning (gone before are Yankee Atomic’s Rowe plant; Connecticut Yankee; Maine Yankee; and Millstone Unit 1 in Connecticut.) The plant was bought from the original owners by Entergy in 2002 with the notion, according to Entergy economist Barrett Green (as reported in the Portland Press Herald), that it would benefit from some future carbon pricing structure. In the end, according to Green as quoted by the Herald, the plant was a “bad investment.”

Legacy?

We could roll out the epitaph of Vermont Yankee easily—designed and built by EBASCO, dates on and off the grid—and much of that has been (and will be) done either briefly or exhaustively in days and weeks to come. Harder to quantify are the tens of thousands of man-hours put into constructing, operating, maintaining, and, yes, inspecting this plant over its four decades of life. The dedication of many men, women, and families to this plant over these decades were not in vain because of what this dedication saved: Millions of gallons of oil whose use was avoided because of the operation of Vermont Yankee. (The use of oil would have brought with it the added cost and the ever present threat of shortage, either due to foreign production control or transportation infrastructure complications.) And then there’s the pollution that would have resulted from generating power to stand in for Vermont Yankee over all those years had it not been built. Few people remember that at the time that these plants in New England were coming into operation, oil fuel was used to provide roughly 60 percent of the area’s electric power. The tool that cut back on that singular dependence? Nuclear energy.

Seen so soon after the fact, it’s hard to look past the present effects—a looming cold winter, in which the Northeast ISO which distributes power in the area is likely to find itself facing price spikes when natural gas use is restricted to home heating, just as it did last year when it had about 600 MWe more capacity than it does now unfettered by such restrictions. Also, there are the people who used to contribute heavily to the community—now are looking at starting over elsewhere. It’s impossible to escape the real, tangible impacts of the shutdown of this plant.

And yet there are those who would celebrate the closing of an old reactor, of course not realizing that nuclear plants are not allowed to grow old. Instead, nuclear plants are updated, improved, and even uprated in power over their lifetimes, always under the extreme scrutiny of the world’s leading nuclear regulator (often referred to as the “Gold Standard” for regulators the world over).

What once was

There are those who campaigned mightily to keep this plant open—workers, concerned citizens, experts in the field of nuclear energy—who have now seen their efforts thwarted by the plant owner having declared the plant no longer economic to continue operating. Many people are aware of the stabilizing effect on the grid that nuclear plants have, the price-controlling effect that buying nuclear fuel two years at a time has, and at no end the reliability of nuclear plants in extreme weather of all sorts. For naught? No. Those same arguments, those same reasoned explanations, all fit nuclear plants everywhere. The fight having been fought–and learned from—is far more important to our nation’s discussion of energy than might be gleaned from a wished-for future in which the fight never took place.

But for now, as a testament to the thousands of people who designed, built, operated, regulated, and fought for this plant, and as a reminder that nuclear energy was once thought of as a marked advancement in man’s quest to provide affordable, reliable energy in this part of the country, perhaps all we need do is quote the preface of the booklet about the Northeast’s nuclear plants, “Yankee Ingenuity”:

“Bound together by heritage, climate, and geography, New Englanders are a certain breed. The hallmarks of New Englanders are the tenacity to get things done and the cleverness to use imaginative methods to do them. Call it ‘Yankee Ingenuity.’ From water wheels to nuclear power, new energy forms have taken root in New England.

The day after President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the amended Atomic Energy Act in 1954, representatives of New England’s major electric utilities met to plan the first privately owned nuclear plant to generate electricity. The products of these and later meetings were the Yankee Atomic Electric Company and New England’s first nuclear plant, Yankee Atomic, which began service in 1960.

During the next two decades, the same resourceful New Englanders proved the economy, safety, and cleanliness of nuclear energy and added to the region’s nuclear generating capacity.

Today, over 30 percent of New England’s electricity is produced by nuclear power plants, a leadership founded on the heritage of Yankee Ingenuity.”

What will “leadership” bring in the field of affordable, reliable energy in the region now? Only time will tell.

———-

For more information:

Vermont Yankee has set up a dedicated decommissioning website.  Click here to see it.

Other New England nuclear plants have been decommissioned and (except for spent fuel storage) returned to ‘green field’ status. Websites for each:

Yankee Atomic Electric (Yankee Rowe)

Connecticut Yankee

Maine Yankee

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Will Davis is the Communications Director for the N/S Savannah Association, Inc. where he also serves as historian, newsletter editor and member of the board of directors. Davis has recently been engaged by the Global America Business Institute as a consultant. He is also a consultant to, and writer for, the American Nuclear Society; an active ANS member, he is serving on the ANS Communications Committee 2013–2016. In addition, he is a contributing author for Fuel Cycle Week, and writes his own popular blog Atomic Power Review. Davis is a former US Navy reactor operator, qualified on S8G and S5W plants.

On behalf of the American Nuclear Society’s Fusion Energy Division (FED) officers, I would like to offer my most sincere congratulations to the organizers of the recent 21^st Topical Meeting on the Technology of Fusion Energy (TOFE), part of the ANS Winter Meeting, November 9–13, in Anaheim, Calif. In particular, I would like to thank Brian Wirth, Vincent Chan, Rajesh Maingi, and the rest of the organizing committee for making the meeting a success.

Plenary sessions topics included updates: on the plans and status of the Chinese CFETR, the Korean K-DEMO, and the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the status of ITER, and a European analysis of the technological roadmap to DEMO.

FED Executive Committee Meeting Attendees on November 9, 2014, Disneyland Hotel, Anaheim, CA

I am thrilled to report that a total of four Division awards were handed out at the TOFE plenary session on Wednesday November 12. The 2014 ANS–FED Outstanding Achievement Award was awarded to Brad Merrill (Idaho National Laboratory) “for his lifelong pioneering and impactful contributions in the development of international fusion safety analysis tools that have formed the foundation for fusion nuclear safety assessments.” Larry Baylor and Steve Combs (ORNL) received the 2014 ANS–FED Technical Accomplishment Award “in recognition of a long history of creative technology solutions in the areas of plasma fueling and disruption mitigation for present and future (ITER) fusion energy experiments and reactors.” Finally, the winner of the 2014 ANS–FED Outstanding Student Paper Award was Juliusz Alexander Kruszelnicki (University of Florida) for his paper titled “Impact of Focusing Grids and Pulsed Power on Modified IEC Fusion Device.”

Lastly, I would like to take this opportunity to announce that the next TOFE will be organized by the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, and will be a stand-alone meeting in the August 2016 timeframe. I look forward to seeing you there!

Susana Reyes, FED Chair

Dr. Susana Reyes

Susana Reyes (NIF/IFE, LLNL)

Susana Reyes is a nuclear engineer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, with more than 15 years of experience in international fusion projects. She is currently the current chair of ANS’s Fusion Energy Division.

by Jim Hopf

There has been a strong response from ANS, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). and many other organizations, pointing out the flawed treatment of nuclear in the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan (CPP). And it appears that these efforts may be having an impact. The EPA has recently stated that the nuclear provisions of the CPP “have raised concerns among stakeholders” and “would likely be revised.”

Treatment of existing plants

A strong chorus of voices from many organizations has pointed out obvious problems with how existing nuclear generation is treated by the plan. Specifically, the issue is that only 5.8 percent of existing nuclear generation counts toward the state-by-state goals of reducing the tons of CO₂ emitted per MW-hr of electricity generation. With respect to the state CO₂/MW-hr goals, the EPA (in a bizarre fashion) defined MW-hrs as something other than the total MW-hrs generated in the state. Instead, the MW-hr total was defined as the sum of all MW-hrs produced by fossil and renewable sources, plus only 5.8 percent of the MW-hrs generated by nuclear. (Some existing hydro sources also had their generation similarly discounted.)

Many responding organizations pointed out that treating non-emitting sources differently, under a plan whose stated objective is reducing CO₂ emissions, is indefensible. In fact, in its formal response to the EPA’s CPP, NEI used the (legal) terms “capricious and arbitrary” to characterize the CPP’s treatment of nuclear (as did I, in a comment in another ANS Nuclear Cafe article). Perhaps the language was meant to be a subtle message that the industry may consider legal action if the CPP is not changed, to treat all non-emitting sources equally. That message should be sent, and I believe that the industry would likely have a good case.

NEI, ANS, and others also argued that, with the (tiny) 5.8-percent factor applied, the CPP would probably not give any significant boost to nuclear, or achieve its stated goal of keeping existing nuclear plants open. In fact, in many states, the CPP may actually create a tangible incentive to close existing nuclear plants and replace them with gas-fired generation, as discussed in this very informative ANS Nuclear Cafe article.

NEI suggested other ways to incentivize existing nuclear generation, such as having nuclear generation in excess of some capacity factor goal “count toward” the EPA’s CO₂ reduction goal. I don’t think NEI means that the CPP should still maintain some bizarre definition of CO₂/MW-hr, where only certain MW-hrs “count” toward the total. I think it mean that the EPA should consider those MW-hrs when deciding what CO₂/MW-hr goal would be appropriate for each state.

Treatment of new plants under construction

NEI, as well as some states and utilities, have also complained about the treatment of new reactor projects under the CPP. As I discussed in a previous article, the EPA considered the plan that each state already had in the works when deciding the emissions reduction goals for each state. Thus, the goals were based on the assumption that those plans would continue to go forward. In the case of Georgia and South Carolina, those plans included a major effort to built two new nuclear power plants (each with two reactors). The decisions to build those plants were made before the EPA developed the CPP.

NEI, and states like Georgia, have taken issue with this approach, arguing that the CPP is essentially penalizing those decisions, by saddling states that made such (good) decisions with a lower CO₂ emissions goal. NEI said that by effectively penalizing those decisions, the EPA is actually creating a disincentive for states, and utilities, to invest in nuclear projects. NEI and the states also argued that the stricter emissions goals would be hard for the states to meet, particularly if any of the plans (such as the reactor construction projects) do not go forward for some reason.

My perspective–Existing plants

NEI, ANS, and other groups have it exactly right with respect to the treatment of existing nuclear plants under the CPP, and it’s encouraging to hear that the EPA is likely to revise the plan in response to the commendable effort the industry and nuclear professionals have made to have their voices be heard. It is obvious that all non-emitting sources should be treated equally under a plan whose stated goal is to (and only to) reduce CO₂ emissions. Any differing treatment should be challenged in court, if necessary.

With respect to the lack of actual incentive (and perhaps disincentive) to keep existing plants open, some have even questioned if this was unintentional. I’m not sure I can dismiss this myself. If it were true that it was intentional, it would be politically brilliant. You put forward a plan that is advertised as a way to help keep nuclear plants open, but actually (secretly) has the opposite effect. Then you get to say, “These nuclear plants were so uneconomical that even with the help we provided, they closed anyway.” Whether this is true or not, the needed response is clear. The industry needed to make its objections (to the arbitrary 5.8-percent factor) loudly heard, and work to get it changed.

What the appropriate reduction goal is for each state is arguable, but one thing is absolutely clear. The definition of emissions intensity needs to be the total state utility sector CO₂ emissions divided by the state’s total generation (in MW-hrs) from all sources, period, end of story. There is absolutely no defensible basis for having it be defined any other way. After all, this is about reducing CO₂ emissions. That reform simply must be made.

Once the above reform is made, the only issue left is (or should be) what the appropriate reduction goal is for each state. People need to understand that. They also need to not make things more complicated than they need to be.

Given that emissions intensity is correctly defined, the only tangible aspect of the CPP is (or should be) the emissions intensity reduction goals for each state, and the basis the EPA used to set them. Once the EPA goal is set, all sources of emissions reduction effectively get “equal credit.” All forms of nuclear generation, above or below any given capacity factor, whether from keeping old plants open, building new ones, or through capacity uprates, are automatically given the same degree of credit, or incentive.

At that point, in terms of what would “best” incentivize nuclear generation, the answer is simple. The lower the state’s emissions intensity target, the more the incentive. This segues into my perspective on the treatment of new plants under the CPP.

My perspective–Plants under construction

NEI and states such as Georgia have made the argument that setting emissions goals that assume nuclear construction projects will be completed is unfair to states with such construction projects and, given the lack of reward for deciding to build the reactors, will actually end up creating a disincentive for new nuclear in the long run. Many other commentators are lining up with that position as well.

I have to say, in my view, that a simpler logic applies. The more stringent a state’s emissions intensity goal is, the more incentive they have to increase the use of nuclear. (Again, given that emissions intensity is correctly defined; where all nuclear MW-hrs apply fully.) In the case of Georgia, a stringent goal would probably remove any likelihood of the Vogtle-3 and -4 not being completed. Also, the lower the emissions intensity target, the greater the likelihood is of Georgia (and Southern Co.) building even more nuclear plants (as is being discussed by the company).

In both NEI’s formal response, and in the testimony of a Georgia Public Service Commission official, references appear to be made to the notion or possibility of the Vogtle-3 and -4 projects not being finished. I personally find it very disquieting to hear such a notion being raised by high ranking officials and (even) nuclear industry organizations. (It’s possible that they were referring only to delays in the projects, and the impacts of such delays on shorter term emissions goals.) If they are referring to a decision to cancel the projects and go back to fossil fuels just because it would be slightly cheaper (as opposed to unavoidable project delays), then I am unsympathetic to their point of view. The entire point of the CPP is to ensure that decisions that reduce CO₂ emissions, even if they are somewhat more expensive, are and continue to be made.

As discussed in my previous article, the EPA based its state reduction goals, in large part, on what states were already planning to do. Their reasoning was probably that if states were already planning on taking certain measures, it seems clear that those measures were not unacceptably expensive or politically unpopular. I argued that perhaps the main real impact of the CPP will be to cement states’ previous decisions, and to (merely) disallow back-tracking. The case of Georgia, and the possibility of cancelling the Vogtle project, would be a prime example of the “no back-tracking” feature of the CPP. Yes, Georgia would suffer greatly if it made such a decision. That’s the entire intent, and should be.

On the contrary, if these construction projects are ignored with respect to setting the state’s emissions reduction goals, it would be relatively easy for them to make such an unfortunate decision. Yes, it would be possible for them to meet the requirements even in the reactor projects did not go forward. That’s the problem!

With respect to the idea that people would be less likely to invest in nuclear in the future because current projects were not “rewarded” by the CPP, again, people will base their decisions on simpler, more direct logic. The more stringent the state goal is (at any given point in the future), the more likely it is that a decision to proceed with nuclear will make practical and financial sense. They will have that much less of an option of going (or sticking) with fossil fuels instead (gas being nuclear’s main real competitor, especially in the Southeast, where most proposed nuclear projects would be, and where renewable resources are poor).

One who really supports nuclear power and/or emissions reductions cannot support the abetting of such a decision. I’m afraid this may be one example where the interest of truly supporting nuclear (i.e., maximizing the use of nuclear in the future) diverges with the interests of states and utilities that happen to (currently) use nuclear power. (Of note is the fact that NEI’s membership consists of such utilities.)

In my view, the position of a “true” nuclear advocate (i.e., one who wants to see the use of nuclear increased significantly in the future) would be to tell the EPA to stick to their guns on the issue of how current nuclear construction projects are accounted for in the setting of state emissions reduction goals. I look forward to a discussion on this, and invite people to express any opposing points of view, or to point out any flaws in my logic.

Jim Hopf is a senior nuclear engineer with more than 20 years of experience in shielding and criticality analysis and design for spent fuel dry storage and transportation systems. He has been involved in nuclear advocacy for 10+ years, and is a member of the ANS Communications Committee. He is a regular contributor to the ANS Nuclear Cafe.

By Laura Scheele

On Saturday, December 13, there weren’t balloons or cake but a plume of water vapor indicated that operations continued as Energy Northwest employees commemorated 30 years of Columbia Generating Station’s commercial operation.

The Reactor Pressure Vessel is lowered at Columbia Station

Since its inception on December 13, 1984, Columbia has generated more than 214 million megawatt-hours of electricity—enough to power more than 1 million homes. Columbia provides safe, reliable, and affordable electricity 24 hours a day, seven days a week to the rate payers of the Pacific Northwest.

Columbia came on-line 30 years ago this past weekend. Like the industry as a whole, its performance has strengthened over time.

Nuclear energy leads way in capacity factor – and reliability

The ratio of electricity produced to the quantity it could produce over a year if it was running at full capacity is known as the capacity factor. For example, the average capacity factor for wind power varies between 20 and 40 percent, while nuclear power maintains an 85 to 95 percent capacity factor, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Increased efficiencies, component upgrades, and performance initiatives contribute to increases in both capacity factor and in power generated. According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, more than 6900 megawatts of power uprates have been approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since 1977—the equivalent of adding seven reactors to the electric grid.

At Columbia, performance improvement initiatives have kept the plant online for more than five years without an unplanned shutdown. Columbia is currently in its longest continuous operational run and has been online for 538 consecutive days and counting with a capacity factor of almost 97 percent. The plant set new generation milestones in calendar years 2012 and 2013; fiscal year 2013; and is poised to set another generation record in calendar year 2014.

No other electricity source can match the reliability of nuclear energy. As ratepayers throughout the Northwest celebrate the clean energy contributions of Columbia Generating Station, we invite nuclear professionals across the world to join us in recognizing the incredible value that nuclear energy provides to our environment, our economy and our lives.

Cheers to the power of the pellet!

____________________________________

Laura Scheele is a Senior Public Affairs Analyst and External Relations Manager at Energy Northwest, a joint operating agency headquartered in Richland, Wash. Energy Northwest develops, owns and operates a diverse mix of electricity generating resources, including hydro, solar and wind projects – and Columbia Generating Station, the Northwest’s only nuclear energy facility. She is an active ANS and ANS-Eastern Washington Section member.

PBS television is premiering on December 9 the documentary “Rickover: The Birth of Nuclear Power” at 7 pm Central time. (Please check TV listings for scheduled viewing times in your area. Not all PBS stations will air the documentary on December 9.)

Rickover, the father of the nuclear Navy, is described by PBS as a unique American hero, unafraid to buck the system and yet inspiring to the men under him.

When few thought it possible, then-Captain Rickover undertook a quest to harness the power of the atom to drive the first nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Nautilus, whose trip under the polar ice pack was one of the great adventure stories of the 1950s, according to PBS. Later, Rickover was instrumental in the building of the world’s first commercial nuclear power plant at Shippingport, Pa. Rickover’s achievements made him into a national celebrity, and he appeared on the cover of Time magazine.

Many questioned Rickover’s goal of a nuclear Navy. Others questioned his methods—PBS noted “his arrogant, high-handed behavior, and his creation of a technocratic elite, his own navy within the Navy.” Few, however, contested that he had transformed the Navy and much of U.S. industry, and changed the course of America’s technological development.

Today, as the United States looks for alternatives to fossil fuels such as nuclear power and tries to lower its carbon footprint, many wonder whether the nation can maintain its technological pre-eminence. Accordingly, PBS noted, “we would do well to consider the man who created the nuclear Navy, as well as the civilian nuclear power industry, Hyman Rickover.”

Manifold Productions has assembled a distinguished Board of Advisors for the documentary: Admiral Bruce DeMars, USN (Ret); Richard Hewlett, and Richard Rhodes.

A book on Rickover—”The Never-Ending Challenge of Engineering: Admiral H.G. Rickover in His Own Words“—is available from the American Nuclear Society by clicking here.