Category Archives: Nonproliferation

ANS Meeting Preview: Nuclear nonproliferation panel on Middle East

Nuclear Nonproliferation, International Safeguards, and Nuclear Security Challenges in the Middle East

Monday, November 12
1–4 pm
Grand West Room
Town and Country Resort and Conference Center
San Diego, CA

The American Nuclear Society’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Technical Group will host a Distinguished Panel at the 2012 ANS Winter Meeting and Nuclear Technology Expo in San Diego. An ANS social media representative will be in attendance to relay audience and panel questions and responses via the ANS organizational twitter handle @ans_org.

The United Arab Emirates is set to become the first Arab country to adopt nuclear power to meet its growing domestic energy needs. Many other countries in the Middle East have publicly expressed interest in pursuing nuclear technology for generating electricity and for water desalination purposes. These countries include the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen.

This potential nuclear renaissance in the Middle East is happening at the same time as popular uprisings known as the “Arab Spring” that are changing the political topology of the region.

The Distinguished Panel is aimed at exploring the political, technical, and market challenges to the development of nuclear power in a post- Arab Spring Middle East, in the context of non-proliferation, safeguards, and security. This topic is of utmost importance and tremendous interest to the nuclear science and technology community, as it exemplifies the importance of flexibility and resilience in the approach to such challenges.

The panel includes high-level representatives from industry, academia, national laboratories, and the region including:

Abdelmajid Mahjoub
Director General
Arab Atomic Energy Agency

Ayman Hawari
Commissioner for Nuclear Reactors
Jordan Atomic Energy Commission
Professor of Nuclear Engineering
North Carolina State University

Brian Boyer
Project Leader, International Safeguards
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Marilyn C. Kray
Vice President, New Plant Development
Exelon Nuclear Partners
President
NuStart Energy Development LLC

The panel was organized and is being chaired by Rian Bahran, a PhD candidate in nuclear engineering and science at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and a member of the ANS Nuclear Non-Proliferation Technical Group (NNTG). Rian is the former president of the ANS student section at RPI and was the general chair of the ANS Student Conference at Rensselaer in 2006. He was also the vice-chair of the ANS Student Sections committee from 2007–2010 and has recently been nominated for a position on the executive committee of NNTG.

Rian—who is originally from Yemen—says that he would like attendees “to learn about the region’s current geopolitical and socioeconomic issues, in respect to how they impact nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and security.” Rian also notes: “Social media outlets like Twitter and Facebook were both instrumental and congruently grew with the massively spontaneous organization of populous revolts. Therefore, it is only appropriate to utilize Twitter to solicit some of the questions during the panel, as an homage to these successful movements that are fighting against stronghold autocratic rule, and toward a more representative and democratic government.”

_________________________________

The future of nuclear at #MOXChat

By Laura Scheele

On September 11, the National Nuclear Security Administration (U.S. Department of Energy) hosted a public meeting in Chattanooga, Tenn., concerning its Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement on the disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for use in power reactors. You may have seen the ANS Call to Action for the hearing and perhaps read the ANS position statement or background information.

L to R: Stephanie Long, Nick Luciano, Alyx Wszolek, and Suzy Hobbs Baker.

This is the story about how ANS members fulfilled the mission set forth in the position statement:  to inform the public and media about the nonproliferation benefits of the MOX fuel program. It’s also the story of how ANS student members answered the Call to Action and contributed to the success of this event for the Society.

The Chattanooga ANS Local Section and the Chattanooga State Community College ANS Student Section both committed to supporting the September 11 hearing as a priority outreach project. ANS Public Information Committee Chair Dave Pointer e-mailed nearly 700 ANS national and student members within a 5-state radius and asked them to come to the hearing to represent the Society, to explain why MOX fuel use makes sense, and to make a stand for nuclear in an area where nuclear opponents had monopolized the public discussion about nuclear.

ANS members showed up.

ANS student members from University of Tennessee-Knoxville (UT-K): (l to r) Hailey Green, Remy Devoe, Tyler Rowe, Seth Langford, John Wilson, and Brent Fiddler. (Photo by Charles Ellsworth)

LOTS of ANS members showed up.

Chattanooga State Community College ANS students wear their blue-and-orange shirts in a standing-room-only public hearing.

MOST of the ANS members who showed up were students.

The faculty and student delegation from University of Tennessee-Knoxville (UT-K). (Photo by Charles Ellsworth)

ANS members who couldn’t show up replied to the e-mail to say they couldn’t come, but wanted to pass along their encouragement and their belief that this was the right thing to do.

We can take pride in how well the Society was represented in Chattanooga.

The students took pride in representing the Society and the profession—and did so very well.

Chattanooga was a communications victory for ANS across the board: a great turnout for nuclear professionals and students and a great event for explaining the benefits of MOX fuel technologies.

Defying expectations

The presence of so many young people supporting the ANS position on MOX fuel made a definite impression upon attendees. The most common question I was asked by non-ANS participants was, “How many Chattanooga State students are here today?” One gentleman who opposed MOX fuel prefaced his remarks by saying that he once taught at Chattanooga State and was thrilled to see so many students attending the hearing.

Chattanooga ANS Local Section Chair Samuel Snyder wrote following the hearing:

Samuel Snyder, Chattanooga ANS Local Section Chair

Samuel Snyder comments during the hearing.

One thing that struck me last night was the average age of those who attended the meeting in support of the nuclear science and technology industry. When you take last night’s “pro-nuclear” group as a whole, I would say that the average age was in the 20s.

A good number of students were willing to get up in front of the group and provide public comments in favor of the ANS-backed proposal for the disposition of surplus plutonium. The comments were very civil from the “pro” side, and mainly civil from the “anti” side, though my biased opinion is that the “pro” side did a much better job of presenting facts and providing sound arguments for their position.

It’s good to have friends…

This was the first public hearing experience for most of the participants. Recently, Chattanooga has seen a lot of anti-nuclear activity, including opponents who stage protests dressed as zombies.

In asking ANS members to attend this hearing, we were asking nuclear professionals to venture outside of their comfort zone in terms of making public comments on an issue that might not really be their area of expertise—and oh, by the way, you might also need to wade through a crowd of zombies who will be heckling you. No worries!

Three ANS students wisely team up and keep their backs to the wall to prevent a zombie sneak attack. (L to R: Alyx Wszolek, Steven Stribling, and Stephanie Long ) (Photo by Charles Ellsworth)

That’s what friends (and professional membership societies) are for—to watch your back when you’re surrounded by zombies. Being the only science-informed person in the room can sometimes be uncomfortable and even intimidating. There is strength in numbers, and so coming together on a vitally important issue strengthens our association by strengthening our professional and personal bonds.

…Especially social media friends

Suzy Hobbs Baker of the Nuclear Literacy Project drove from South Carolina to support the hearing. (Photo by Charles Ellsworth)

The social media promotion of this event contributed to its success. The ANS Social Media Group is an amazing collection of people with wildly different perspectives and backgrounds who share one thing: the conviction that the nuclear community needs to improve how we communicate if nuclear energy’s promise is to be realized.

 

Alex Woods, Chattanooga State

Alex Woods, Chattanooga State Student Section president, led off the comments.

Individually and collectively, they have shed much blood, sweat, and tears in their efforts—and they are willing to lend a hand so that your blood, sweat, and tears might be spared.

#MOXChat was the twitter hashtag for the Chattanooga hearing. The live-tweeting provided a minute-by-minute rundown of the comments and observations by nuclear professionals across the country who followed this on twitter. Unfortunately, the tweets have expired on Twitter.

A roundup of social media coverage of #MOXChat is at the end of this article. Many thanks to everyone who supported this event via social media. Your observations and advice were invaluable, and many of the students brought printouts of your entries to the hearing as prep material.

Steven Skutnik

Steven Skutnik

A special tip of the ANS Nuclear Cafe cap to Steve Skutnik, who did it all at this hearing: made public comments, live-tweeted the hearing, live-blogged the hearing here at the ANS Nuclear Cafe, blogged pre- and post-hearing at his Neutron Economy blog, and helped prep students in his capacity as UT-K assistant professor. Thanks, Steve!

 

The power of  showing up

Howard Shaffer, Meredith Angwin and Eric Loewen

Howard Shaffer and Meredith Angwin receive presidential citations from ANS Past President Eric Loewen.

Meredith Angwin and Howard Shaffer have spearheaded a nuclear advocacy effort in Vermont that has changed the public debate over nuclear energy. They often talk about the value of  ‘Showing Up’ to support nuclear. By showing up, Meredith and Howard have built a pro-nuclear grassroots movement in a place where people sometimes seem to think nuclear is a four-letter word.

Pro-Nuclear Rally in Chattanooga, Tennessee

Go Team Nuclear!

We asked ANS members to come to the hearing and comment on behalf of ANS—but we also asked those who could not comment to show up and support their friends and colleagues. They did—and they applauded every comment. Some who couldn’t stay for the hearing showed up to meet with the students and answer questions that they had about MOX fuel and reactor operations.

ANS members mingle before the public hearing begins.

Everyone there contributed to the success of this event—just by showing up.

Having fun is contagious

The disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium is a serious issue. The ANS student members took seriously the responsibility of speaking on behalf of the ANS position and the need to counter some of the more implausible assertions by the nuclear opponents who attended.

Chris Perfetti preparing his public comments.

Taking the responsibility seriously, however, doesn’t mean being humorless. Sometimes we err too much on the side of serious and need to remember that positive experiences build upon themselves: having fun at an event makes it more likely that you’ll do something similar in the future.

Besides, we’re hilarious! Why try to fight it?

Sometimes a little #MOXSnark needs to be vented due to the wild claims made by nuclear opponents.

And sometimes brilliant ideas—like ANS Man, or a YouTube show featuring Sarcastic Science Guy in a Turquoise Shirt, or setting future public comments to cheering cadences—are born of these shared experiences.

All I will say is this:  My understanding of  plutonium dispersion factors has been forever transformed. Or, as Steve Skutnik live-tweeted, #youprobablyhadtobethere.

You know, in Chattanooga.

WHERE ANS ACHIEVED TOTAL DOMINATION*!

*in a technically credible, knowledgable, and thoroughly polite and eloquent manner, while adhering to the highest standards of safety (no zombies were harmed in the writing of this post).

L to R: Remy Devoe, John Wilson, Rob Milburn, and UT-K Student Section President Ryan Sweet

Social media roundup

Rod Adams, Atomic Insights:
Plutonium Power for the People

Meredith Angwin, Yes Vermont Yankee:
MOX & Hearings in Chattanooga
Meeting Success Story in Chattanooga
Show Up for Nuclear in Chattanooga

Steve Skutnik, Neutron Economy:
Wading into the Zombie Nuclear Horde
Mixing it up over MOX – a wrapup from Chattanooga

Dan Yurman, Idaho Samizdat:
Mix it Up about MOX in Chattanooga
Calling Out Red Herrings about MOX Fuel for TVA

US Areva:
Can you Talk MOX? 10 Things You Need to Know about MOX Nuclear Fuel

Chattanooga State students stand near a MOX fuel assembly mock-up at the open house. (L to R: Geneva Parker, Mark Hunter, and Brian Satterfield) (Photo by Charles Ellsworth)

Center for Nuclear Science and Technology Information

ANS was able to support this important effort thanks to funding provided through its Center for Nuclear Science and Technology Information.

___________________________________

 Laura Scheele is the Communications and Public Policy Manager for the American Nuclear Society’s Communications and Outreach Department.

Intermission blogging

The draft SEIS meeting for disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel started out relatively smoothly—lots (and I mean lots) of pro-nuclear folks in the room; my initial estimates would put the pro-nuclear folks from the University of Tennessee and Chattannooga State University at over half the crowd present. No zombie sightings as of yet.

Public comments beginning soon—in the meantime, Suzy Hobbs-Baker put together some excellent counter-cultural pro-nuclear signs.Pro-nuclear signs for the MOX meeting

Likewise, the Department of Energy open house preceding the meeting featured some very cool mockups of the proposed MOX fuel assemblies, including cutaways to show MOX fuel pellets within fuel assembly pins.

MOX assembly model

A mock MOX assembly

Laura Scheele of the American Nuclear Society is speaking now, presenting the official ANS position statement on disposition of surplus plutonium into MOX fuel, so that means the intermission is over…

Live from Chatanooga – Introductions

Hi folks, Steve Skutnik here—you may know me from The Neutron Economy blog. I’m also currently an assistant professor of nuclear engineering at the University of Tennessee. I’ll be here with Suzy Hobbs-Baker (of PopAtomic Studios) and Laura Scheele live-blogging the public hearing on the use of surplus weapons plutonium in MOX fuel. I’ve also got a healthy contingent of eager students from the University of Tennessee here as well, eager to speak up for the nonproliferation benefits of disposing of surplus plutonium in MOX fuel.

UTK ANS students

Our eager (and photogenic!) contingent of nuclear engineering students from UTK

Call to Action: Public hearing on MOX fuel tonight in Chattanooga

WHO:          

American Nuclear Society members in the Tennessee Valley region

WHAT:       

Public hearing on the use of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel technologies for surplus plutonium disposition—Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

WHEN:       

Today, Tuesday, September 11
5:30pm–8:00pm Eastern Time (click HERE for schedule—scroll down)

WHERE:

Chattanooga Convention Center
1150 Carter Street
Chattanooga, Tenn. 37402

WHY:            

The existence of surplus weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium constitutes a clear and present danger to national and international security.
National Academy of Sciences, 1994

The American Nuclear Society endorses the rapid application of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel technology to accomplish the timely disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium (ANS position statement).

Industry and professional organizations should work to inform the public and media about the nonproliferation benefits of the MOX fuel program and the safe and successful track record of manufacturing and using MOX fuel.

Come join many of your fellow nuclear professionals and ANS members in the nuclear science community in the Tennessee Valley area to help provide some credible scientific and technical perspective on this important issue, as well as play an essential role in providing factual, credible information in this public setting to increase public awareness.

The hearing will be live tweeted at #moxchat.

Stay tuned to the ANS Nuclear Cafe for updates on the hearing later today.

________________________________

Revisiting Reprocessing in South Korea

The U.S. doesn’t want to hear about it

By Dan Yurman

The Cold War is over and North Korea has another nut job for a political leader, this time it is an untested youth still shy of his 30th birthday. Claims by the United States that South Korea must not pursue uranium enrichment and reprocessing because of the unpredictability of its northern neighbor are getting little traction in Seoul these days. The reason is that South Korea is a major user and exporter of civilian nuclear energy. It wants energy security and to recover the energy value in a growing inventory of spent fuel from its reactors.

According to World Nuclear News, South Korea is now a major nuclear energy country. It won a $20-billion contract to supply four nuclear reactors to the United Arab Emirates. Within the past two months, the UAE nuclear safety agency approved a license for the first unit and construction is underway at a remote site on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Three more South Korean reactors will be built there by 2020.

Today, 23 reactors provide one-third of South Korea’s electricity from 20.7 GWe of plant. The government says it intends to provide 59 percent of electricity from 40 units by 2030.

Nuclear energy remains a strategic priority for South Korea, and capacity is planned to increase by 56 percent to 27.3 GWe by 2020, and then to 43 GWe by 2030.

Revising a 40 year old treaty

Comes now the request by the South Korean government, first aired in October 2010, to revise the bilateral cooperation treaty with the U.S. It has been in place for more than 40 years and it is a cornerstone of U.S./South Korean diplomatic relations.

Many specialists in the field of nonproliferation see a “hard and fast” policy against any expansion of uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing as a key to stopping states like North Korea from pursuing these activities. That strategy hasn’t worked and, as a result, South Korea wants relief from the restriction in the now-decades-old treaty.

Negotiations over changes to the treaty have been going on since last December, but appear to be stalemated around a key set of issues. It is a delicate dance, as diplomats like to say, because if the U.S. leans too heavily on South Korea, it could sour relations between the two countries and spawn nationalist sentiment that might lead to a nuclear weapons program. Since the 1950s, South Korea has depended on the U.S. nuclear arsenal as a shield against aggression from its neighbor to the north.

Spent fuel with no place to put it?

But South Korea doesn’t appear to want its own weapons. Instead, what it has told the U.S. is that it wants to reprocess fuel from its growing commercial fleet and to create fuel for new reactors. The country has more than 10,000 tonnes of spent fuel stored at its civilian reactors. It is producing 700 tonnes per year of spent fuel and expects to run out of space by 2016. A geologic repository in the densely populated country seems out of the question.

The trouble is that the current treaty inked in 1972 allows South Korea to import nuclear reactor technology in return for a ban on enrichment and reprocessing. South Korea’s first commercial nuclear reactor entered revenue service in 1978 and the latest in 2012.

The big issue on the reprocessing side is what will be done with the plutonium extracted from the spent fuel. U.S. nonproliferation experts claim that its mere presence in South Korea, regardless of international controls and inspections, will inflame relations with North Korea. South Korean government officials call this reasoning nonsense, since North Korea has already been producing plutonium and has its own uranium enrichment capabilities.

Gary Samore, Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism

The current position of the U.S. government, as expressed by its chief negotiator Gary Samore, is that it does not want to change the treaty.

Instead, the U.S. wants South Korea to continue to get its nuclear fuel from France or the U.S. The country gets up to 30 percent per year of its nuclear fuel from the U.S. and the rest from France.

What’s good for the goose?

For its part, South Korea calls this position hypocritical, pointing out that Japan enriches uranium and reprocesses spent fuel. Even more to this point, South Korea says that the U.S., for strategic reasons, supported India’s request to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group even though India conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1974 and 1988. In short, South Korea is not buying what it calls a “double standard” from the U.S.

In response, U.S. diplomats have let slip to South Korean news media that they harbor a “deep distrust” of South Korea’s intentions due to a clandestine weapons effort that briefly operated in the 1970s under then President Park Jung-hee.

A face-saving plan offered in principle by the U.S. is for South Korea to adopt a so-called “proliferation resistant” technology for reprocessing fuel called pyroprocessing. The method does not initially separate plutonium in a way that allows it to be refined for use in a nuclear weapon. The U.S. has offered South Korea financial assistance to conduct tests on the technology. Critics call this a diplomatic fig leaf, saying that eventually weapons grade material could be extracted if the country really wants it.

For South Korea, the objectives for change are clear. What the U.S. will need are iron clad agreements that the South Korean government will never pursue “nuclear sovereignty,” and agree to international oversight and inspections.

Even with these measures, U.S. diplomats see enrichment and reprocessing in South Korea as “incentives” for North Korea to increase its investment in nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation experts remain divided about whether or not limiting South Korea’s access to enrichment and reprocessing will have any useful effect on its neighbor to the north.

Samore says that the U.S. hopes to ink a new treaty by 2014. He’s got his work cut out for him.

______________________

Dan Yurman publishes Idaho Samizdat, a blog about nuclear energy and is a frequent contributor to ANS Nuclear Cafe.

ANS adopts position statement on U.S. global nuclear leadership through export-driven engagement

On Thursday, June 28, the American Nuclear Society’s Board of Directors formally adopted a position statement entitled U.S. Global Nuclear Leadership through Export-Driven Engagement. ANS position statements reflect the Society’s perspectives on issues of public interest that involve various aspects of nuclear science and technology. The text of the June 2012 position statement is below, and the full list of ANS positions statements can be accessed via the ANS website by clicking HERE.

U.S. Global Nuclear Leadership Through
Export-Driven Engagement

June 2012

ANS believes the U.S. should remain committed to facilitating an expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the export of U.S. nuclear goods and services.  Exports of nuclear technology provide the U.S. with important nonproliferation advantages, including consent rights on U.S. manufactured nuclear fuel, the ability to control the transfer of nuclear technology, and greater influence in the nuclear policies of U.S. partner nations. The U.S. possesses a strong nuclear technology portfolio and supply chain. The federal government should be an active partner in helping U.S. industry maintain and increase its market share of nuclear goods and services, as U.S. nuclear exports have the attendant benefits of improving global standards of nuclear safety and security and minimizing the risk of proliferation.

ANS believes that the U.S. should work with organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology and that a competitive global market for fuel cycle services strongly discourages the spread of ENR technology.  Reasonable assurance of access to fuel and other services needed to operate their nuclear plants can dissuade nations from domestic development and deployment of ENR technology.

The U.S. is one of several nations that are capable of supporting the development of nuclear technology in emerging markets.  Those nations are aggressively promoting their nuclear technology with bilateral nuclear trade agreements that generally do not contain ENR prohibitions.  Many U.S. partner nations are unlikely to forswear their right to pursue ENR technologies, even if they have no intention to develop them.  Any U.S. insistence that its bilateral nuclear trade agreements ban development of indigenous ENR technologies would be counterproductive to its nonproliferation goals and put U.S. technologies at a competitive disadvantage.

In short, a U.S. nuclear export regime that restricts rather than promotes U.S. nuclear trade will ultimately reduce U.S. influence in shaping the safety and security norms of the global nuclear landscape.

In order to enhance U.S. nonproliferation goals through its export policies, ANS recommends that the U.S. government should:

  1. maintain a flexible approach for negotiating bilateral nuclear trade agreements (also known as 123 Agreements);
  2. continue developing a coordinated approach to promoting U.S. technology to other nations; and
  3. ensure U.S. nuclear export policies and procedures are transparent and responsive to the needs of  the U.S. nuclear industry.

__________________________

 

 

 

ANS’s Mark Peters testifies to Congress on recycling used nuclear fuel

On  Wednesday, June 6, Dr. Mark T. Peters appeared on behalf  of the American Nuclear Society before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.  Peters is the Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs at Argonne National Laboratory and testified at the invitation of the subcommittee.

The  hearing is titled “What’s Next for the U.S. – Korea Alliance.” Additional information, including all prepared testimony,  is available via the Committee website. Peters’ prepared testimony is below and can be downloaded in PDF format by clicking HERE.

 Recycling Used Nuclear Fuel: Balancing Energy and Waste Management Policies

Testimony to U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

Mark T. Peters, American Nuclear Society
June 6, 2012

My name is Mark Peters, and I am the Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs at Argonne National Laboratory. However, today I am speaking on behalf of the American Nuclear Society; my remarks should not be considered as an official statement from Argonne or the Department of Energy.

Peters

I appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) on used nuclear fuel recycling as a means to achieve an integrated solution to energy and waste management policy. The ANS is a not-for-profit, international, scientific, and educational organization with nearly 12,000 members worldwide. The core purpose of ANS is to promote awareness and understanding of the application of nuclear science and technology. The ANS also wishes to acknowledge its longstanding professional collaboration with the Korean Nuclear Society (KNS). For more than 40 years, our two organizations have worked together to promote the safe and secure use of nuclear technology and materials.

For decades, the United States has grappled with the multiple challenges of crafting a long-term solution for the management of used nuclear fuel. These persistent challenges have taken on new urgency in the wake of the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which has focused international attention on used nuclear fuel storage. Although the challenges of waste management require close scrutiny, these issues are most effectively considered within the context of an integrated policy for nuclear energy and nuclear waste management. Unfortunately, the United States is unique in its lack of such an integrated policy. Most other nations that rely on nuclear energy, including France, Russia, China, Japan, and Republic of Korea, have policies in place that promote development of used fuel recycling and advanced fast reactors, in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of their nuclear investments. We must consider our nuclear energy technology collaborations and partnerships within this global context.

At present, the United States’ strategic investments in advanced nuclear energy technologies are lagging; as a result, we rely increasingly on collaborative arrangements with foreign research institutions to conduct research in these areas. These collaborations provide advantages to both parties, and the United States has benefited from them. However, close alignment between government and nuclear industries in these nations speeds the international deployment of these cooperatively developed technologies, such as used fuel recycling and fast reactor technologies, while the United States has moved much more slowly in its adoption of them.

The Republic of Korea has publicly expressed its interest in incorporating electro-metallurgical reprocessing technology, commonly known as “pyroprocessing,” into its long-term nuclear fuel cycle plans. Pyroprocessing offers several potential benefits over current aqueous recycling techniques, such as the PUREX process being used in France and Japan today. These include the ability to recover minor actinides, which otherwise contribute significantly to the long-term radiotoxicity of used nuclear fuel; fewer releases of fission gases and tritium; and, the lack of production of pure plutonium, which helps to address proliferation concerns. Clearly, there will be engineering challenges inherent in the development of pyroprocessing technology, as there are with any other advanced manufacturing processes. However, these challenges can be addressed through joint research and development activities, and solving these challenges will have important implications for the United States as well as the Republic of Korea.

The American Nuclear Society believes that nuclear fuel recycling has the potential to reclaim much of the residual energy in used fuel currently in storage as well as used fuel that will be produced in the future, and that recycling offers a proven alternative to direct disposal of used fuel in a geological repository. In other nations, recycling of nuclear fuel with proper safeguards and material controls, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has demonstrated that high-level waste volumes can be reduced safely and securely while improving the sustainability of energy resources.

It is the opinion of the ANS that the United States should begin planning a thoughtful and orderly transition to nuclear fuel recycling in parallel with the development of a geologic repository. Recycling would enhance the repository’s efficiency, eliminating the need for most complex and expensive engineered barriers and reducing the timeframe of concern from more than 100,000 years to a few hundred years.

The ANS also believes that the United States should accelerate development of fast spectrum reactors, which are uniquely capable of generating energy while consuming long-lived waste. Six decades ago, on December 20, 1951, scientists and engineers from Argonne National Laboratory started a small electrical power generator attached to an experimental fast reactor, creating enough energy to power four 200-watt electrical bulbs. That historic achievement demonstrated the peaceful use of nuclear energy and launched today’s global commercial nuclear energy industry. But it should not be overlooked that the first electricity generated through nuclear energy was produced using a fast reactor.

In closing, let me reiterate that the ANS believes that nuclear energy has a significant role to play in meeting the global energy demands of the 21st century, and that a global expansion of nuclear energy can be achieved safely and securely. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

BACKGROUND

Current Recycling Technologies

PUREX: Current commercial used nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies are based on the PUREX process, a solvent extraction process that separates uranium and plutonium and directs the remaining minor actinides (neptunium, americium, and curium) along with all of the fission products to vitrified waste. The PUREX process has more than 50 years of operational experience. For example, the La Hague reprocessing facility in France treats used fuel from domestic and foreign power reactors. The plutonium recovered is recycled as a mixed-oxide fuel to generate additional electricity. This technology also is used for commercial applications in the United Kingdom and Japan.

There are a number of drawbacks to the PUREX process. PUREX does not recover the minor actinides (neptunium, americium, curium, and heavier actinide elements), which compose a significant fraction of the long-term radiotoxicity of used fuel. Advanced fast reactors can transmute and consume minor actinides if they are separated from other fission product elements, but incorporation of minor actinide separations into existing PUREX facilities adds complexity and is outside commercial operating experience. Moreover, existing international facilities do not capture fission gases and tritium; these are discharged to the environment within regulatory limits. Although plutonium is recycled as mixed oxide fuel, this practice actually increases the net discharge of minor actinides. Finally, the production of pure plutonium through PUREX raises concerns about materials security and proliferation of nuclear weapons-usable materials.

Pyroprocessing: Pyroprocessing is currently being used at the Idaho National Laboratory to treat and stabilize used fuel from the decommissioned EBR-II reactor. The key separation step, electrorefining, recovers uranium (the bulk of the used fuel) in a single compact process operation. Ceramic and metallic waste forms, for active metal and noble metal fission products respectively, are being produced and qualified for disposal in a geologic repository. However, the demonstration equipment used for this treatment campaign has limited scalability. Argonne National Laboratory has developed conceptual designs of scalable, high-throughput equipment as well as an integrated facility for commercial used fuel treatment, but to date only a prototype advanced scalable electrorefiner has been fabricated and successfully tested. Additionally, work is underway at Argonne to refine the fundamental understanding of pyrochemical processes to achieve greater control of the composition of the recovered materials, which will facilitate developing safeguards consistent with U.S. non-proliferation goals.

Fuel Cycle Research in the United States

In the United States, the primary organization with responsibility for the research and development of used fuel recycling technologies is the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), through its Fuel Cycle Research and Development program. This program supports research to develop and evaluate separations and treatment processes for used nuclear fuel that will enable the transition from the current open fuel cycle practiced in the United States to a sustainable, environmentally acceptable, and economic closed fuel cycle. Ongoing projects related to reprocessing and waste management include:

• Using advanced modeling and simulation coupled with experiments to optimize the design and operation of separations equipment.
• Exploring an innovative one-step extraction process for americium and curium, radionuclides that are major contributors to nuclear waste toxicity, to reduce the cost of aqueous-based used-fuel treatment.
• Further developing pyrochemical processes for used fuel treatment. These processes enable the use of compact equipment and facilities, treatment of used fuel shortly after discharge from a reactor, and reduction of secondary waste generation.
• Developing highly durable and leach-resistant waste forms of metal, glass, and ceramic composition for safe, long-term disposal.

However, it must be noted that the United States increasingly relies on collaborative arrangements with foreign research institutions and universities to conduct research in these areas. For example, Argonne, Idaho, and other U.S. national laboratories are working with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, in a series of joint studies sponsored by the United States and Republic of Korea, to study disposition options for used nuclear fuel, including pyroprocessing, in order to develop economic, sustainable long-term solutions, consistent with non-proliferation objectives, for nuclear energy production and waste management. The state of U.S nuclear research facilities is declining compared to steady investments being made in countries such as France, Russia, Japan, and Republic of Korea. More importantly, those governments, as part of their national energy policies, have committed to the development and deployment of advanced fast reactor technologies, which are an important element of an integrated energy and waste management policy.

Advanced Fast Reactor Technology

The American Nuclear Society believes that the development and deployment of advanced nuclear reactors based on fast-neutron fission technology is important to the sustainability, reliability, and security of the world’s long-term energy supply. Nearly all current nuclear reactors are of the “thermal neutron” design, and their capability to extract the energy potential in the uranium fuel is limited to less than 1% of that available. The remainder of the energy potential is left unused in the discharged fuel and in the uranium, depleted in U-235, that remains from the process of enriching the natural uranium in the isotope U-235 for use in thermal reactors. With known fast reactor technology, this unutilized energy can be harvested, thereby extending by a hundred-fold the amount of energy extracted from the same amount of mined uranium.

It is the opinion of the ANS that fast reactors in conjunction with nuclear fuel recycling can diminish the cost and duration of storing and disposing of waste. These cost savings may offset cost increases in the fuel cycle due to reprocessing and fuel re-fabrication. Virtually all long-lived heavy elements are eliminated during fast reactor operation, leaving a small amount of fission product waste that requires assured isolation from the environment for only hundreds of years. The design and construction of a geologic repository would be substantially less complex and costly. Just as importantly, a repository of this type could be located in a very broad range of areas, increasing the likelihood of multiple host locations.

Summary

The American Nuclear Society endorses development of used nuclear fuel recycling in fast neutron spectrum reactors in parallel with a geologic repository to secure an integrated, sustainable nuclear energy system for the United States. This initiative should balance the needs of the nuclear energy production sector with those of the waste management sector to achieve an integrated system that increases resource utilization for energy production, disposes waste in an environmentally acceptable manner, and is economic. The global nature of nuclear energy production and waste management encourages the continuation of U.S.-foreign collaborations to develop and demonstrate recycling and fast reactor technologies. In this regard, the relationship between the United States and Republic of Korea is of mutual benefit and of strategic importance to our nuclear energy and waste management policies.

_______________________

Congressional debate over terms of future 123 agreements

By Jim Hopf

In 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a “123” agreement, which allowed the transfer of US nuclear technology (e.g., reactors, etc.) to the UAE. As a condition of the agreement, the UAE gave up all rights to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel, now and at any point in the future. Thus, the UAE agreed to give up significant rights that are granted to it as a signee of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The UAE agreement is now fueling a debate in Washington as to whether or not similar conditions should apply to all future US 123 agreements with nations that want to start nuclear programs.

The debate has significance since several more 123 agreements will be considered in the near future, with nations such as Vietnam, Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia. Some of these nations (e.g., Jordan) have significant uranium reserves that they may desire to exploit someday, which may make them reluctant to give away any future enrichment rights.

Pros and Cons

The arguments for requiring new nuclear nations to give up rights to enrichment and reprocessing, as a condition of any 123 agreement with the US, are as follows:

  • Unlike power reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities can potentially give those nations access to weapons-useable nuclear materials, and could greatly shorten the time required to develop a weapon, if they ever chose to do so.
  • Given the mature, well-established, competitive world industry for uranium enrichment services (with multiple enrichment facilities in several developed nations), there will not be a need for developing countries to establish enrichment or reprocessing facilities.
  • It would not make economic (or practical) sense for a new nuclear nation with a small number of power reactors to develop enrichment or reprocessing capability and construct those expensive facilities. Thus, any desire to do so would be suspect.
  • Holding all nuclear entrants to such high standards would strengthen the international community’s arguments against less cooperative nations such as Iran.

There are, however, many arguments against requiring terms similar to the UAE agreement for all future 123 agreements. These include:

  • Such a (US) policy would have little effect since there are several developed nuclear nations, including France, Russia, China, and South Korea, competing in the world nuclear market that will not make such demands on potential customers.
  • Few new (developing) nations would be willing to surrender rights granted to them under the NPT, especially given that most nuclear supplier nations will make no such demands.
  • If (as a result) few such nations enter into 123 agreements with the US, the US will lose influence over those nations’ nuclear power programs, which would stem from their dependence on US technologies, and our involvement with their reactor operations.
  • It is possible that such nations would instead turn to suppliers with less safe reactor designs, and a lower level of experience and/or excellence in reactor operations.
  • Without an absolute no-enrichment requirement, the US may (on a case-by-case basis) be able to successfully negotiate 123 agreements that are stronger (stricter) than agreements offered by other nuclear supplier nations. With an absolute no future enrichment requirement, most nations will almost certainly instead enter into agreements with other supplier nations, which may make few if any demands.
  • If a 123 agreement with the US is in place, and the US therefore has influence and involvement with a country’s nuclear program, the US may be better able to convince that nation to not engage in fuel cycle activities in the future.
  • There are other ways to limit enrichment activities, including actions by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and ensuring that a reliable and adequate supply of enrichment services exists in the world market.
  • Finally, requirements for entering into an agreement with the US that are much stricter than those required by other suppliers will likely result in US reactor and nuclear technology companies being shut out of much, if not most, of the market in the developing world. In addition to any negative safety or proliferation impacts, this will have a significant negative economic and employment impact in the US.

House Bill

A bill, H.R. 1280, which essentially requires the same terms as the UAE agreement for all future 123 agreements, has been introduced in the House. It has passed the Foreign Affairs committee and is now being debated in the Rules committee. It may soon be voted on by the full House.

In addition to prohibiting enrichment or reprocessing facilities at any point in the future, the bill requires:

  • Limited access to facilities, equipment or materials by 3rd country nationals (personnel of a separate nationality to both the US and the developing nuclear nation).
  • Implementation of chemical and biological (weapon) production and stockpiling conventions.
  • Implementation of an export control system.
  • Cooperation with the US in preventing state sponsors of terrorism gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
  • A ban on (non-humanitarian) assistance to nations that have not signed the NPT.
  • Joint congressional approval for any changes or additions to the terms of new 123 agreements.
  • Liability protections for US nuclear suppliers similar to those given under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (i.e., more protection than India is offering).

Tauscher – Poneman Letter

On January 10 of this year, Undersecretary of State for arms control and international security Ellen Tauscher and Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman wrote a letter to key congressional committee leaders. The letter stated that an administration internal policy review has concluded that future 123 agreements should be made on a case-by-case basis, and that the administration would not seek the same requirements agreed to by the UAE for all future agreements.

The letter gave many of the reasons listed above (and argued elsewhere) as to why an absolute no-enrichment-requirement for all 123 agreements would not be good policy. The letter also discussed other actions that may or are being taken, including strengthened enrichment activity guidelines agreed to by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, nuclear fuel reserves, fuel leasing arrangements, and progress towards establishing a Nuclear Fuel Bank.

On the basis of the above-referenced letter, it appears that the administration will not be in favor of the House bill. The bill also faces a very uncertain future in the US Senate.

Additional Thoughts

I find some encouragement in the fact that even the non-proliferation side now appears to have accepted that power reactors in developing countries do not present a significant proliferation risk, and that the focus should be on enrichment and/or reprocessing facilities. I’ve always believed this, since spent power reactor fuel is at least as hard to convert into weapons material as raw uranium ore. The widely held belief that Iran’s enrichment activities (independent of nuclear power plants) constitute a proliferation risk further supports this principle.

Now, the debate seems to have shifted to what is the best way to prevent such fuel cycle facilities from popping up in more countries. Given that there is ample enrichment capability in the (developed) world, any such limitations should not significantly hold back the deployment of nuclear power.

The administration and others have argued that new nuclear states are likely to be reluctant to give up enrichment rights granted to them under the NPT, since they have uranium reserves and may want to complete the supply chain, or they don’t fully trust the current supplier nations to reliably supply the needed enrichment services. I would add a psychological/political reason. Policies that restrict fuel cycle facilities (or nuclear technology in general, or even nuclear weapons) to a set of existing “advanced” nations implies a notion that “we are civilized enough to responsibly handle this technology, but you are not.” Such notions tend to produce negative or contrary responses from most people (or nations). They will be very inclined to opt for the suppliers who do not make such (condescending?) demands, especially given that the right to fuel cycle technology is enshrined in the NPT, which they willingly signed.

Also of note is the fact that natural gas prices in the U.S. are currently very low (~$2/MBTU) and may stay relatively low for some time. This may limit the prospects for new nuclear here in the U.S. This makes access to international markets—where natural gas prices are much higher—even more important to the U.S. nuclear industry. Small modular reactors (SMRs) in particular, are an area where the U.S. may be able to take the technological lead and reestablish leadership in the world nuclear industry. A healthy market for those SMRs, however, would be necessary.

Conclusion

It seems to me that policies like those outlined in H.R. 1280 would not provide any of their intended benefits unless there was an agreement between all nuclear supplier states to follow those policies. Without such an international agreement, all H.R. 1280 will do is harm the US nuclear industry, and have significant negative economic and employment impacts here at home.

H.R. 1280 may even have negative worldwide impacts in terms of nuclear safety as well as nuclear proliferation, since it will result in most, if not all, nuclear entrant states forging agreements with other nuclear supplier states instead. Those other states are likely to be willing to enter into nuclear supply agreements that have less stringent requirements than what the US would be likely to negotiate, on a case-by-case basis, in the absence of H.R. 1280.

__________________________

Hopf

Jim Hopf is a senior nuclear engineer with more than 20 years of experience in shielding and criticality analysis and design for spent fuel dry storage and transportation systems. He has been involved in nuclear advocacy for 10+ years, and is a member of the ANS Public Information Committee. He is a regular contributor to the ANS Nuclear Cafe.

Plutonium in Space: Why and How?

By Wes Deason

The reasons for using plutonium in space missions are often unclear to those outside the mission planning community. Observers may see or hear only that the space mission is nuclear related, and that the power source uses plutonium.

Plutonium is a word that in some communities has very negative connotations. Plutonium was needed to create the atomic weapons of the Cold War, is highly regulated by proponents of nuclear nonproliferation, and is one of the causes of the environmental woes at the Hanford site in Washington State. On the other hand, it is also the element that has been used to safely power many space missions, including the Voyager, Galileo, Cassini, New Horizons, and the most recent Mars rover, Curiosity.

So, why is plutonium still used if it has issues associated with it?

The answer is that plutonium exists in multiple nuclear forms, or isotopes. Isotopes occur in elements naturally due to differing number of neutrons in the nucleus. While relatively unimportant on the chemical level, on the nuclear level isotopes of a single element can behave very differently. Plutonium-239, the isotope of plutonium with 94 protons and 145 neutrons, is a fissile isotope, meaning that after the absorption of a non-energetic neutron it has a possibility of splitting, or fissioning. Because of this capability, plutonium-239 can be used in nuclear reactors and weapons. Plutonium samples with a large fraction of the plutonium-239 isotope are referred to as weapons-grade plutonium.

However, devices that use plutonium to produce power use the plutonium-238 isotope, which has 94 protons and 144 neutrons. It is not fissile, and cannot be used in atomic bombs or nuclear reactors. Plutonium-238 is useful for radioisotope heat sources, and radioisotope power systems, because it decays radioactively, releasing a particularly useful form of radiation called alpha radiation.

Alpha radiation is simply energized and completely ionized helium atoms, which lose their energy in the form of heat when interacting with other matter. This energy loss mechanism is similar to how friction generates heat on a surface. Alpha radiation is generally not harmful to humans, provided its emitters are not inhaled or ingested; alpha particles can be stopped by the outermost layer of skin.

Pu-238 is safe and can produce heat, but why is it preferred over other power sources?

Radioisotope power systems are useful for space applications for two main reasons:

  • First, they are very versatile. Unlike solar power sources, radioisotope power systems do not rely on correct orientation toward the sun, nor do they depend on proximity to the sun.
  • Second, the power from plutonium-238 lasts a long time. The half-life of plutonium-238, or the amount of time it takes for the power produced by the isotope to decrease by half, is 87.7 years.

A power system fueled by plutonium-238 can last for a very long time. This is, of course, dependent upon the reliability of the heat-to-electricity conversion components. The most common power conversion method—a static system known as thermoelectric conversion—is very reliable and can last for decades.

Future radioisotope power systems will adopt a new method for power conversion called the Stirling cycle—a dynamic (moving) cycle—which will allow for higher efficiency and lower mass systems. The new generators will be termed Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generators. For more information on radioisotope power systems, see this page maintained by the Department of Energy.

Where do we get plutonium-238? Can it be found naturally?

Unfortunately, plutonium-238 cannot be found naturally. This is because it is radioactive and will have almost completely decayed into a different element after a geologically short period of 1000 years. Thus, plutonium-238 must be produced using nuclear reactors.

During the Cold War, when weapons-grade plutonium production was at full scale, plutonium-238 was a byproduct that could be saved and used for space power production.  Since the 1990s, however, the United States has stopped production of weapons-grade plutonium, yet we continue to plan space missions that require the use of plutonium-238. NASA and the DOE have discussed plans to use national laboratory reactors to produce plutonium-238 for general purpose applications, but it is questionable if they will be able to supply a sufficient amount to meet national needs.

Another concept, proposed by the Center for Space Nuclear Research (CSNR), uses flexible TRIGA research reactors to produce a higher quantity of Pu-238 per year at lower cost. For more information on low cost plutonium-238 production, contact the CSNR.

Regardless of its source, Pu-238 remains an important tool for scientific research. Many space missions have been powered by plutonium-238, and future missions will continue to be enabled by it. Its long lasting heat generation—coupled with a dependable power conversion system—allows it to be used in many environments and configurations. The use of plutonium-238 can be expected to become even more important as space exploration pushes further outward to Mars, Jupiter, their moons, and beyond!

This article is the first of a monthly series of ANS Nuclear Cafe entries on nuclear space topics by the ANS Aerospace Nuclear Science and Technology Professional Division.

_______________________________

Deason

Wes Deason is a graduate student in nuclear engineering at Oregon State University working on the safety analysis of vented fuel systems for gas-cooled fast breeder reactors. He is a former summer fellow for the Center for Space Nuclear Research and the current student liaison for the Aerospace Nuclear Science and Technology Division of ANS.

GE-Hitachi proposes to burn U.K. plutonium stockpile

An advanced reactor could be used to consume 112 tonnes of weapons grade material

By Dan Yurman

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy has proposed to the U.K. government to build an advanced nuclear reactor that would consume the country’s stockpile of surplus plutonium.

The technology is called PRISM, which stands for Power Reactor Innovative Small Module. If accepted, it would be very different than the other proposals to process plutonium, including those that would turn it into mixed oxide fuel (MOX).

According to GE Hitachi, the PRISM reactor disposes of a great majority of the plutonium as opposed to simply reusing it over again. This process takes it out of circulation forever.

PRISM cutaway (Source: GE Hitachi)

Fuel for the PRISM reactor is created by converting the plutonium from powder form mixing it with uranium and zirconium to make a metal fuel. The resulting spent fuel contains plutonium in a form that cannot be used to make nuclear weapons.

Eric Loewen, chief engineer on the project (and president of the American Nuclear Society), said that the waste form is much the same as what comes out of light water reactors. Once the plutonium has been in the PRISM reactor for five years, it is mixed with other nuclear materials that make it nearly impossible to retrieve the metal for the purpose of making a weapon.

The PRISM reactor is a so-called “fast reactor” because it uses liquid metal sodium rather than water to cool the system. The sodium allows the neutrons to maintain higher energies and to cause fission in elements such as plutonium more efficiently than light water reactors.  (large image)

Heritage of EBR-II

Based on the design of the Integral Fast Reactor (EBR-II) developed at the Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho, the PRISM reactor uses passive safety features that cause it to shut down automatically. In the event of a complete loss of electrical power, it simply stops working and passively dissipates residual heat. EBR-II was canceled in 1994, but not before a safety analysis showed that there were no technical barriers to getting a license and safely operating one.

The Argonne National Laboratory as it appeared in the 1990s when work was stopped on EBR-II.

According to a fact sheet from GE Hitachi, the PRISM reactor’s relatively small size and simpler design would allow it to be built in modules and transported for assembly on site. Another benefit of the reactor is that while it is disposing of weapons materials, it is also generating electricity.

According to the proposal, there would be two PRISM reactors each generating 300 MW of electrical power. It would take about five years to burn through the 112 tonnes of material. The reactors could be used for up to 60 years.

The UK government had considered building a MOX plant at the Sellafield site where the plutonium is stored, but it canceled those plans as the Japanese government stopped orders for MOX following the Fukushima earthquake.

Total life-cycle costs

GE Hitachi contends that the PRISM reactor will cost less to build than a new MOX plant. It is costing the U.K. government £2 billion (about $3.1 billion) a year to maintain the plutonium inventory.

In the United States, the government is building a MOX plan that will process 34 short tons of plutonium, turning it into the equivalent of 1,700 PWR MOX fuel assemblies for light water reactors at a cost of $4.5 billion.

MOX fuel burnup process. (Image: World Nuclear News)

If an assumption is made that the delivered cost of the PRISM reactor is $4,500/Kw, then 600 MW of power would cost $2.7 billion or about the cost of one year of storing the plutonium in its current form.

Additional costs would include a fuel fabrication facility, the fuel itself, and spent fuel disposal. Life-cycle costs would have to be taken into account to get a true comparison.

The U.K. government hasn’t said what it thinks of the GE Hitachi proposal, but it has talked about what it needs to know to make a decision.

Feasibility and safety issues

In addition to financial feasibility, U.K. energy minister Charles Hendry told parliament that the government needs to know the work can be done safely and securely. He said U.K.’s Department of Energy & Climate Change would examine the PRISM proposal. He also said that the government is considering converting 28 tonnes of foreign-owned plutonium at the Sellafield site into MOX.

GE Hitachi VP Danny Roderick

GE Hitachi vice president Danny Roderick told financial wire services that while the government is looking at the plutonium as a security risk, his firm sees it as an asset that can be burned to make electricity.

The plutonium was created as a result of nuclear spent fuel reprocessing, which took place at the Sellafield site starting in the 1950s.

In October 2010, GE Hitachi signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site to investigate the feasibility of constructing a prototype of the PRISM reactor there.

Coincidentally, the proposal to use the technology from EBR-II comes almost 60 years to the week that electricity was first generated on the Idaho desert in its predecessor EPR-I.

At 1:23 p.m. on December 20, 1951, Argonne National Laboratory director Walter Zinn scribbled into his log book, “Electricity flows from atomic energy. Rough estimate indicates 45 kw.” At that moment, scientists from Argonne and the National Reactor Testing Station watched four light bulbs glow, powered by the world’s first nuclear reactor.

________________

Yurman

Dan Yurman publishes Idaho Samizdat, a blog about nuclear energy, and is a frequent contributor to ANS Nuclear Cafe.

 

Are India’s nuclear deals going south?

Domestic liability laws and international issues may put limits on the country’s ambitious plans to build new reactors

By Dan Yurman

U.S. Sec. of State Hillary Clinton meets with India Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna on July 26, 2011.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is in India this week to pressure India to open its nuclear energy markets by changing its domestic supplier liability laws.

If she is successful, it would give American vendors hunting licenses to bid for massive nuclear reactor contracts said to be worth $150 billion over the next several decades.

In a joint news conference July 20 with Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna, Clinton said that differences over trade and nuclear legislation must be resolved if the benefits of U.S. support for India’s civilian nuclear program three years ago is to accrue to U.S. companies.

Under then President George W. Bush, the United States successfully pushed the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow India to buy uranium for its civil nuclear program. In return, India pledged in return to open its markets to U.S. vendors.

Political opposition forces in the Indian parliament, however, saw an opportunity to give Prime Minister Monahan Singh a black eye and imposed a draconian supplier liability law on nuclear energy projects. The parliament has locked out American firms, but not French and Russian state-owned nuclear agencies that now have significant commitments for the bulk of foreign supplied reactors.

Clinton was characteristically straightforward in her remarks. She said, “We need to resolve those issues that still remain so that we can reap the rewards of the extraordinary work that both of our governments have done.”

Enter the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Since then, the United States has been working to bring pressure on India through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). While neither nation will openly admit it, the United States may be seeking leverage to get India to reconsider its liability law by squeezing in another area.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group supports non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.

In June 2011, the NSG adopted new rules that ban the sales of key technologies and equipment that have primarily civilian applications, but are considered “dual use,” e.g., also can be used to make nuclear weapons.

In the meantime, the U.S. relationship with India with regard to nuclear energy matters is in a downward spiral. Ashley Tellis, an expert on U.S.–India relations at the Carnegie Endowment, told the Christian Science Monitor (CSM) on July 19 that, “The Americans have reasons to be peeved about how [the NSG agreement] has worked out.”

Others accuse the United States of using the NSG as leverage to open India’s markets to U.S. firms. This is one of those obvious moments that illuminate the gamesmanship involved in the high stakes outcomes.

Bharat Karnad, a foreign policy expert in New Dehli, also told the CSM that the “NSG is being used by the U.S. as a tool to advance reactor sales.”

India is a nuclear state, but has refused to sign the nuclear nonproliferation agreement. Its stance kept it from accessing world markets for uranium for more than three decades. The Bush administration helped push the NSG to make a special exception for India. The new rules, however—also supported by Russian and France—address uranium enrichment and used fuel reprocessing technologies.

The intent is to prevent the proliferation of technologies that can be used to make highly enriched uranium or extract plutonium from used fuel. Instead, the United States, Russia, France, and other nations are offering access to international fuel banks. These programs would essentially lease nuclear fuel to other countries and retrograde the used fuel back to the fuel bank. This way, nations could be assured of reliable fuel services without having to build their own fuel cycle facilities.

Will India blacklist suppliers?

Nirupama Rao, India’s Foreign Secretary

India isn’t buying it and, what’s more, is officially annoyed at these latest developments. Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao implied that India would blacklist any nation that supported the new rules by denying them new nuclear contracts.

“We will defend ourselves to the hilt,” she said, but added diplomatically, “I think the latest NSG decision is not the end of the road.”

A move to “blacklist” American firms would be more or less pointless and ineffective since the liability law already does this. The French and the Russians, however, have significant skin in the game and are much more vulnerable to this kind of pressure.

France has contracts with India to build two 1600-MW EPR reactors, and Russia has built two and is completing two more 1000-MW VVER reactors, with options to build as many as eight more 1000-MW units and six 1200-MW units.

In a preemptive move, the Russians said in early June that they had dealt with the liability law by simply adding insurance for the future costs of compensation to the delivered price of the two new units at Kudankulam. In effect, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. will be paying a risk premium for its country’s liability law.

Japan exports at risk?

Life is getting more complicated for India since it plans to also have a civil nuclear agreement with Japan. That nation’s nuclear exports are very significant and also represent a major piece of its domestic steel industry. Key firms including Toshiba, Hitachi, and Mistubishi all want the two countries to sign off on the agreement.

The banana peel on the negotiating room floor is a statement by Japan Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who said that as part of Japan’s retreat from nuclear energy, it would also suspend its exports to India, Brazil, and several other countries.

This statement set off howls of protest from the business sector. The Japan Times quoted business think tanks as estimating a half a million people could lose their jobs. Kan has subsequently backed off, claiming that he meant the nation would reduce its nuclear sector “eventually,” but not right away.

The key issue is that Japan Steel Works provides the large forgings for reactor pressure vessels. If Japan stops exporting these components, the whole global nuclear industry is facing a significant delay.

India and the United Kingdom have plans to build new forging plants, but production is years away. South Korea has a contract with the United Arab Emirates, which would take priority for its output from Doosan.

All of the Japanese nuclear firms that export their reactors also sell components, including turbines, steam systems, and generators. The Japanese prime minister’s comments may be the stuff of political opportunism of the moment, but the rock he threw in the pond made waves that washed up on India’s shore.

If India decides to “blacklist” Russian, French, and U.S. firms over NSG policies in terms of sales of nuclear components, it needs to think carefully about where it will get reactors for its ambitious nuclear energy program.

————-

Dan Yurman publishes Idaho Samizdat, a blog about nuclear energy, and is a frequent contributor to ANS Nuclear Cafe

40th Carnival of Nuclear Energy Bloggers

The fuel cycle is a frequent topic in the nuclear blogsphere

This is the 40th Carnival of Nuclear Energy Blogs. The carnival  features blog posts from the leading U.S. nuclear bloggers and is a roundup of featured content from them.

If you want to hear the voice of the nuclear renaissance, the Carnival of Nuclear Energy Blogs is where to find it.

This is a great collaborative effort that deserves your support. Please post a Tweet, a Facebook entry, or a link on your Web site or blog to support the carnival.

Bloggers call foul on NRC licensing and Yucca Mountain

The staff at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission might feel like a soccer ball at a World Cup match after reading the critiques of three nuclear bloggers. In their view, the NRC is not scoring any points with them. Their issues are decision processes for relicensing, how fast the agency moves applications for new licenses through its approval process, and the increasingly muddy waters of the end of the Yucca Mountain project.

Yes Vermont Yankee

Yes Vermont Yankee notes that Duane Arnold and Vermont Yankee are sister nuclear plants. Duane Arnold’s license review took two years and two months.  Vermont Yankee’s license review is at five years and counting. It is pointed out that if the NRC were actually using objective criteria to evaluate plants, this would not happen.

Next Big Future

The NRC does not have enough money to process all the COL (combined operating license) applications in 42 months. Some of the applications, however, are not ready for prime time because of deficiencies, and other license reviews have been suspended at the applicant’s request. The situation is better with reactor design certification. There, NRC expects to finish by 2011 (claim made in 2009) all three that it has docketed.

CoolHandNuke

The NRC has just released a heavily redacted version of the Yucca Mountain review. This action has been justified using a maneuver within the Freedom of Information Act, the process by which the Heritage Foundation sought access to these documents.

What was redacted, you ask? Well, it was the scientific analysis and unbiased recommendation of the NRC staff, something that the taxpayers and nuclear utilities have paid millions upon millions of dollars for, but Chairman Jaczko seems bent on preventing.

Spent fuel is here to stay

An example of dry cask storage

Three states are suing the NRC over the issue of spent fuel stored in dry casks at the Indian Point nuclear plant. New York’s attorney general led the charge.

Idaho Samizdat – New York’s AG sues over spent fuel at Indian Point.

Idaho Samizdat reports that the state of New York has sued the NRC over the issue of storage of used nuclear fuel in dry casks at the Indian Point reactors in Westchester county. It is a politically motivated act promoted by New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo ,who campaigned on a platform of closing Indian Point.

Idaho Samizdat – New York may have lost the case before the ink was dry. New York’s lawsuit may fail as the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals just ruled against an anti-nuclear group in California that sued over the very same issue at the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant. If courts in New York look at the Ninth Circuit ruling for precedent, it could turn serious litigation into nothing more than a publicity stunt.

Learning from the opposition

People who are opposed to nuclear energy are good at what they do. The public is scared silly about radiation as a result. Are there ways to push back?  Several bloggers explore the landscape.

Pop Atomic – Learning from anti-nukes: An alternative strategy.

Save Vermont Yankee ~ original artwork by Pop Atomic Studios

Anti-nuclear activists are good at exploiting cracks in the media coverage of thenuclear industry. Can the nuclear industry learn from this tactic? Is is a good idea?

It may seem like anti-nukes “don’t get it,” but you must admit that they are good at what they do, and they do make nuclear projects as difficult as possible.

It is time to take a closer look at what is working for anti-nukes, and examine exactly what they are trying to achieve. Is it possible that we have a lot to learn from each other?

Nuke Power Talk – Are people finally getting it or not?

People are beginning to capture the subtleties of the issues of nuclear power compared with other energy sources. An editorial entitled “Energy Roulette” in  the Washington Post calls for a technology-neutral carbon reduction standard, saying that if “the government interest is in reducing climate change…why should government aid only wind and solar?”

NEI Nuclear Notes – big splash in USA Today.

Editions of USA Today in many regions of the country include a special section on the nuclear energy industry. The section includes a foreword by Nuclear Energy Institute president and chief executive officer Marvin Fertel on the value of nuclear energy, as well as articles and advertising from many nuclear energy companies.

Nuclear Fissionary – Greenpeace activists swarm Spanish nuclear site.

Greenpeace activist on cooling tower at Spanish nuclear plant

Twenty Greenpeace activists entered a nuclear reactor compound in eastern Spain and several of them climbed a cooling tower to protest the use of nuclear power, a Spanish official and Greenpeace spokeswomen said.

Some of them attacked and injured three security officers. The men were assaulted as the angry mob of activists painted the word “peligro” or danger on the cooling tower.

Greenpeace claims that this reckless stunt demonstrates that nuclear power plant security is weak. The truth is, the cooling tower is outside of the secure areas of the plant and the activists never got anywhere near the reactor or the redundant security barriers.

Nuclear Town Hall – Report on fuel rods creates false fears.

A story about potential defects in reactor fuel rods was siezed upon by citizens groups opposed to nuclear energy. On closer inspection, however, the story reveals that alarmist hand-wringing over a gloom-and-doom scenario is not warranted.

If the rods begin to crack, they release boron and tritium into the cooling water, a condition that can easily be monitored.

“As long as there is no significant increase in boron or tritium observed, the recommendation would be continue operation until the end of the operating cycle,” NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan, told the Wall Street Journal.

Areva North America Next Energy – Survey says American support nuclear energy.

A survey found that 79 percent of respondents agree that “to jump-start investment and maintain U.S. competitiveness, the federal government should provide guarantees backing loans for buildings solar, wind, advanced-design nuclear power plants, or other energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases.” Nineteen percent of those surveyed do not agree, and two percent don’t know.

Those who “strongly agree” outnumber those who “strongly disagree” by a similarly lopsided margin, 46 percent to 10 percent.

This was a telephone survey of 1000 U.S. adults was conducted on February 10-13 by Bisconti Research Inc./GfK Roper for the Nuclear Energy Institute.

Thorium fueled reactors generate interest

Nuclear Green – Rising interest in thorium fueled reactors.

Full-size thorium fuel assembly for a 1000 MWe Russian VVER-1000 nuclear power plant

Now that China has announced interest in developing innovative thorium-fueled reactor designs, a lot of people are paying attention.

Despite [the Chinese announcement of LFTR development plans] not making a ripple in the wider press, there’s a chance this development could be very significant. If the advocates of LFTRs are proved correct—and their arguments are certainly very compelling—then the Chinese could be taking one of the first substantial steps in a new type of nuclear race.

And the stakes are high: as Kirk Sorensen reports, the project “aims not only to develop the technology, but to secure intellectual property rights to its implementation.” It will be very interesting to see what happens next.

Oil company business model v. nuclear energy

Atomic Insights – Embargo oil business model.

The Atomic Insights blog has been covering the business competition between oil, gas, and nuclear energy. This week, it takes on the oil company business mode,l exploring reasons why it is low on innovation, yet high on profits.

ANS launches India Section

ANS Nuclear Cafe – A passage to India.

ANS India Local Section officers (from left: Kumar, Deshpande, Joshi, and McDaniel)

The American Nuclear Society presented the charter to the ANS local India Section at its inaugural event held in Mumbai, India, on February 11, 2011. ANS Past President Harold McFarlane led the presentation of the charter, which was granted in November 2010 by the ANS Board of Directors.

The keynote address for the meeting was given by Vice Admiral John Grossenbacher, director of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), who talked about recent U.S. developments in nuclear research and development.

The event was hosted by the U.S. Counsel General for Mumbai, Paul A. Folmsbee, and attended by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke. The event took place with the simultaneous visit to India by representatives of 24 U.S. firms on a trade mission. A delegation from INL also visited.

Reprocessing used fuel

Recovering uranium and plutonium from used fuel can power a nation’s factories and cities. We recycle aluminum, glass, and paper, so why not used fuel? The logic appears to escape some in the United Kingdom and elsewhere

Canadian Energy Issues

Get ready for a righteous fight over plutonium in the UK. The coalition government has launched consultations on the question of whether to recycle it in power reactors, or entrain the stuff permanently in glass logs and dispose of it, or just keep it in long-term storage.

Expect the professional environmental lobby—with the full support of the professional anti-proliferation lobby—to oppose recycling, and to back up that opposition with reasoning that is either weak or outright contradictory.

Brave New Climate – Safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle.

The purpose of this post is to compare the safeguards challenges presented by two nuclear recycle approaches, relative to the current U. S. approach of a once-through fuel cycle. If these nuclear fuel cycles are evaluated solely on the basis of the safeguards needed, one finds the following:

PUREX recycle offers no safeguarding advantage over the once-through fuel cycle. Beyond that, this approach presents a significant concern over handling of separated plutonium in the power plant environment. Since chemically pure Pu is inherent in the PUREX process, safeguards inspections must be highly intrusive.

Adding recycling fast reactors with pyroprocessing (“PYRO”) to an existing fleet of LWRs absorbs all of the plutonium produced by LWRs. There will be no inventories of plutonium other than what is in active use. PYRO is a new class of facility requiring safeguards, but batch-process inventory controls, coupled with a simple mechanical layout, will make the inspectors’ jobs more straightforward than for a PUREX facility.

The facility for recovering usable material from used LWR fuel may require safeguards similar in approach to those in PUREX facilities, but no separated plutonium will be involved. If plutonium were to be diverted from a PYRO facility or from the LWR recovery facility, it would be useless (for weapons use) without further processing in an otherwise unneeded PUREX type of facility.

Realistically, a full transition to recycling fast reactors is a process that will take decades. If, however, all the LWRs were retired and replaced with recycling fast reactors, in addition to the above advantages, there would be no further need for uranium enrichment.

This is a guest post by William Hannum, a member of the Science Council for Global Initiatives who has worked for more than 40 years in nuclear power development, stretching from design and analysis of the Shippingport reactor to the Integral Fast Reactor.

Hannum earned his BA in physics at Princeton and his MS and PhD in nuclear physics at Yale. He has held key management positions with the U. S. Department of Energy.

Hannum is a fellow of the American Nuclear Society, and has served as a consultant to the National Academy of Engineering on nuclear proliferation issues.

# # #

ANS in passage to India

The Society opens its 9th international section

Harold McFarlane, past president, American Nuclear Society

The American Nuclear Society presented the charter to the ANS local India Section at its inaugural event held in Mumbai, India, on February 11, 2011. ANS Past President Harold McFarlane led the presentation of the charter, which was granted in November 2010 by the ANS Board of Directors.

The keynote address for the meeting was given by Vice Admiral John Grossenbacher, director of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), who talked about recent U.S. developments in nuclear research and development.

The event was hosted by the U.S. Counsel General for Mumbai, Paul A. Folmsbee, and attended by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke. The event took place with the simultaneous visit to India by representatives of 24 U.S. firms on a trade mission. A delegation from INL also visited.

The ANS India Section, created after more than six months of planning, is promoting nuclear science and technology through information exchanges and professional relationships in the United States and India.

According to ANS India Section President Corey McDaniel, more than 50 guests from Indian nuclear agencies and organizations attended the inaugural meeting. McDaniel said that the objectives of the new ANS section are to:

  • Encourage public understanding of nuclear sciences and engineering,.
  • Cooperate with other scientific and professional groups.
  • Encourage closer professional relationships and personal interactions among members.
  • Share the U.S. experience and learn from the Indian experience.

Corey McDaniel, chairman, ANS India Section

“We want to promote interactions between scientists, engineers, and technologists from the government, industry and universities in our countries to promote better understanding of the civil uses of nuclear power and technology,” McDaniel said.

He added, “The growing role of ANS in the international community cannot be overstated. I’m delighted that the 100 new members of this section are joining the 11 000 members of ANS in the advancement of the science and engineering practice of nuclear energy.”

McDaniel, who represents SMR developer NuScale in Mumbai, said that the section is willing to host a meeting for interaction with its U.S. counterparts “any time a prominent U.S. nuclear business or government agency sends a representative to India. Our colleagues in the Indian nuclear industry will want to come to interact with them.”

The India Section plans to highlight U.S. nuclear education, industry, and government leaders during its annual conference in September 2011  in Mumbai.

McDaniel has been an ANS member since 1989 and currently serves as a board member of the ANS International Committee. He will chair the committee beginning in June 2011. Prior to taking up his business-related post in Mumbai, he was legislative director for U.S. Sen. Jim Risch (R., Idaho).

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke speaks in Mumbai at the ANS India event addressing, among others, executives of Westinghouse (Gary Urquhardt), GE (Caroline Reda), and NuScale (Corey McDaniel). A banner with the logo of the ANS India Section is at the right.

Idaho National Laboratory expands its relationship with India

As the ANS meeting was taking place on February 11, the representatives of 24 U.S. firms, including seven in the nuclear industry, were visiting India as part of an official U.S. trade mission. Also traveling to India independently of the trade mission were representatives from INL. The goal of both groups was to learn more about India’s nuclear energy community and to identify nuclear development opportunities and partnerships that will benefit both countries.

John Grossenbacher, director, Idaho National Laboratory

During its 10-day visit, the INL delegation interacted with leaders and researchers in government, industry, and academia. Their visit included meetings with representatives of higher education at the India Institute of Technology-Bombay, the Department of Atomic Energy  (and its two nuclear energy laboratories), the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Ltd., the National Thermal Power Corporation, and a number of industry representatives.

“All advanced nuclear energy nations benefit by understanding each other’s nuclear enterprises and collaborating where appropriate,” said INL director and delegation head John Grossenbacher.

After representing the Energy Department during the negotiations of the 123 Agreement on civil nuclear energy cooperation, INL arranged for U.S. technical support of the working group’s second meeting in January 2010 in Mumbai.

In April 2009, INL hosted the first working group meeting at its facilities in Idaho Falls, Idaho. This meeting took place following the  United States and India signing an agreement in October 2008 on peaceful nuclear cooperation. The agreement aims to provide new opportunities for trade and job creation for both economies and to bring India closer to the nonproliferation mainstream.

India’s nuclear program

India has a an indigenous civil nuclear power program with just under 5 GWe of nuclear power. It has announced plans to build 20 GWe in new nuclear capacity to be on line by 2020 and 63 GWe by 2032, and it aims to supply 25 percent of electricity from nuclear power by 2050.

Since 2008, India has been ramping up its plans to acquire nuclear technology and fuel through international trade.

While no U.S. firms have contracts to build reactors in India, Russia’s Atomstroyexport and France’s Areva have inked contracts to build new commercial reactors at multiple sites.

See, for instance, the Dr. S.K. Jain interview by the Economic Times on November 29, 2010, about NPCIL’s proposed 10 000-MW nuclear power project at Jaitapur in Maharashtra.

India is developing expertise to deploy commercial fast reactors and eventually develop reactors based on the thorium fuel cycle.

Small firms and large in trade delegation

NuScale, which was spun out of research at Oregon State University, is developing a small 45-MW nuclear power system that is modular and scalable. It was one of two Oregon companies that went to India for the February 6–11 trip: FLIR Systems of Wilsonville, which produces a wide range of commercial infrared cameras, also went to India, according to a press release from the office of U.S. Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.)

Also traveling with the 24-firm trade mission were representatives from Exelon, G.E. Hitachi, and Westinghouse. The U.S. delegation included nuclear component and instrument makers Transco, Curtis-Wright, and Thermo Fisher Scientific.

The trade delegation made stops in New Delhi, Mumbai, and Bangalore to explore export opportunities in India’s expanding industrial sectors of civil-nuclear trade, defense and security, civil aviation, and information and communication technologies.

Sec. Locke lights a traditional Indian lamp, to commemorate the presentation of the ANS India Section charter, as Dr. S.K. Jain, NPCIL, looks on. From left to right: Admr. Grossenbacher, Gary Urquhardt (Westinghouse VP for India); GE Nuclear CEO Caroline Reda; Sec. Locke; Corey McDaniel, Nuscale Country manager & ANS-India president; Ramesh Deshpande, Westinghouse (ANS-India Treasurer), Dr Jain, GD Mittal - Indian Nuclear Society Treasurer

The INL hosted a dinner after the meeting that was attended by Dr. Anil Kakodkar, former DAE chairman, and S.S. Bajaj, chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board.

Contact the ANS India Section

To date, the India local section has signed up 100 members. A benefit of the local section is that members of the India Nuclear Society can register for free online at the ANS Indian local section website (contact web page).

FYI: ANS Local Section inaugural session meeting summary

India ANS Local Section Leadership (photo below)

  • President: Corey McDaniel, NuScale Power
  • Vice-President: Sunita Kumar, Areva
  • Secretary: Pramod Joshi, General Electric
  • Treasurer: Ramesh Deshpande, Westinghouse

ANS India Local Section officers (from left: Kumar, Deshpande, Joshi, and McDaniel)

Japan puts India in a pressure cooker

No deals for reactor components without
nonproliferation commitments

By Dan Yurman

India’s refusal to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty may delay, or even stop, delivery of massive reactor pressure vessels from Japan Steel Works (JSW). India has plans to build 20 GWe of new nuclear reactors in the next 10 years. Two, and perhaps six, of those reactors will come from Areva, which wants to order parts for them from Japan. These parts aren’t just pumps and pipes. The components that are at the core of a potentially deal-breaking dispute are 400- to 600-ton reactor pressure vessels. A civil nuclear agreement between the two countries is the key to success for India’s ambitions to build $150 billion of new nuclear powered generation capacity.

Before Japan will let JSW supply reactor components to India, it is demanding that India provide a guarantee that it will not conduct a nuclear test nor use its civilian nuclear reactors for military purposes. For its part, the Indian government sees having the option to test its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to military threats from Pakistan, its arch enemy and neighbor, and to remind China, its massive neighbor to the north, to take India seriously in border disputes and Asian security matters.

Japan has made it clear that it wants India to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Japanese diplomats have emphasized that an Indian nuclear weapon test would not only end the supply of new reactor components, it might also trigger a recall of any parts and fuel that have already been shipped for use in new reactors.

India does not have the ability to make its own pressure vessels and is at least five to 10 years away from being able to reliably manufacture them. A nuclear test would trigger draconian commercial consequences. Most significantly, India would lose access to global nuclear fuel markets that it only just restored in 2008 after a 30-year lockout.

Japan’s other problem is that while it has domestic political reasons for pursuing a diplomatic initiative with India, it also has competition for India’s nuclear business from South Korea. The government in Seoul is ready to sell reactor components to India regardless of whether it holds open the option to test a nuclear device.

Two Areva reactors to start, four more to come

The most immediate need by India for Japanese reactor pressure vessels comes from deal for two Areva 1600-MW reactors to be built in Jaitapur. In early January, Luc Oursel, a top Areva executive, told the Times of India that Japan’s demand for India to sign the test ban treaty is throwing a monkey wrench into the deal.

Oursel called for a “bilateral agreement” between India and Japan on the issue. He added that until that happens, the Jaitapur project is not a done deal. Whether India actually signs the treaty, which is unlikely, or provides some other guarantee, which is more likely, doesn’t matter to Areva as long as the issues goes away. Weighing in the balance is an agreement to build four more Areva EPRs, each worth about $4 billion.

A secondary issue is that like the Russians and American reactor vendors, Areva is unhappy about India’s domestic supplier liability law. Oursel told the Times of India that he wants to see adherence to international standards, a reference to an International Atomic Energy Agency convention on nuclear liability that has been signed by India, but not yet ratified by its fractious multi-party parliament.

Japan’s short-term competitive edge

Japan’s leading global role in the manufacture of reactor pressure vessels is temporary at best, despite a four-year backlog of orders. South Korea’s Doosan Heavy Industries is ramping up to manufacture these types of reactor components to supply them as part of a contract to build four 1400-MW reactors in the United Arab Emirates.

The Russians have long been capable of producing reactor pressure vessels. They will supply them for the 18 reactors they are planning to build for India. The first 12 will be 1000-MW VVER designs and the next six will be uprated to 1200 MW.

In the United Kingdom, Sheffield Forgemasters may get a government loan in 2011 that will support construction of a factory to make reactor pressure vessels for Westinghouse AP1000 reactors. Westinghouse is a potential investor in the new factory if the government provides the loan. In the future, Westinghouse could conceivably get the pressure vessels it needs for Indian plants from the U.K.

Among the major commercial nuclear powers, only the United States lacks the capability and/or plans to forge components for large pressure vessels. Paradoxically, U.S. firms may develop expertise in forging pressure vessels for small modular reactors, e.g., less than 300 MW, before they rebuild the capability to forge large ones, e.g., 1000 MW.

India’s forge far in the future

India’s efforts to have its own large forge began last year as part of a joint development project between G.E.-Hitachi, Larsen-Toubro (L&T), and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. They are building a reactor pressure vessel manufacturing facility in Gujarat that also will be the site of at least two GE-Hitachi ESBWR reactors if the liability law can be revised to meet American needs. L&T said in a statement in February 2010 that the plant will be able to produce ingots up to 600 tonnes, which would make it the largest in the world.

Building one of these types of factories takes time. It takes yet more time to become a reliable producer of more than one unit per year. It could take India the better part of a decade to attain that outcome.

Pressure on Japan’s home front

Some of these developments are somewhat circular since the Japanese half of GE-Hitachi would be affected by any diplomatic agreement with India—or the lack of one. The United States has been pushing Japan since last June to sign a nuclear trade agreement with India because of G.E.’s involvement with Hitachi. Also, Japanese manufacturing giants Toshiba (which owns Westinghouse) and Mitsubishi want a deal with India because they feel that they will lose market share to South Korea if the diplomats drag their feet in coming to an agreement.

Japan has leverage for now with its grip on the global market for the giant reactor parts. Japan also has an edge when it comes to providing steam generators and other crucial components for India’s planned new reactors.

Realists want to build nuclear plants

Japan may turn to the United States and France, asking them to help enforce a non-treaty agreement with India to forego any nuclear tests. It would most likely be based on a threat of revoking India’s permission to buy nuclear fuel on global markets. India knows that a nuclear weapons test, for any reason, would undo the agreement it got in 2008 from the Nuclear Suppliers Group allowing it to buy fuel for its reactors for the first time in three decades.

It comes down to a race in Japan to seal a diplomatic deal with India in time to open markets for its heavy manufacturing–capable firms before South Korea takes advantage of the gap. Otherwise, the diplomats may win a round, but at the cost of tens of thousands of Japanese jobs and billions in export earnings.

Realism may prevail in the end. Japan may find that accepting a promise, with teeth regarding India’s supply chain, will be as good as a signature on an international treaty. India may find that accepting an agreement with Japan to uphold a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, without signing the test ban treaty, may get it the reactors, fuel, and components it wants from Japan, France, and the United States.

Update: 01/20/11: Defying non-proliferation hawks, a Japanese envoy indicated that negotiations for concluding a civil nuclear deal with India are on track and can be wrapped sooner rather than later. Sify News, India

____________________

Yurman

Dan Yurman publishes Idaho Samizdat, a blog on nuclear energy. He is a contributing reporter for Fuel Cycle Week and a frequent contributor to ANS Nuclear Cafe.