James Greenidge
Queens NY

Did you even read the article? Unit 4 is completely accessible. Since the reactor was defueled there is no damage to the reacrtor core. Debris from the earthquake/tsunami/hdrogen detonations has been cleared to the point of allowing access. They have been able to get in there and take video of the SFP and it shows everything is in place and undamaged. There is no thermal (burning) damage to the pool. The pool did not go dry. The fuel assemblies did not “burn”. They were able to do a structural evaluation and place very substantial additional supports and strengthen all of the support members. The SPF has withstood sizable aftershocks that hit the area with no damage.

As if Brookhaven National Laboratory, in 2009, somehow simulated a 9.0 earthquake destroying a reactor building that had ALL of its active AND spent fuel rods in the cooling pond which was also blown up and their assessment of the ‘risk of seismically induced spent fuel pool failure’

Pictures were taken of SFP4 and they show the pool to be intact and undamaged. It did not “catch fire”. It did not “blow up”. It did not “dry out”. All of the fuel assemblies are in place as they should be and show no damage.

Truly, the danger to the public caused by surreptitiously-biased, fear-mongering editorial–masquerading as objective reporting–vastly outweighs any danger hypothesized by legitimate and rigorous risk assessments of future earthquakes at the 1F site. The way forward is to continually enlighten the public (with articles such as this): cite the facts, debunk the myths, teach the merits of objective risk evaluation, and, gradually, the impalpability of nuclear technology will fade–along with the credibility of the alarmist propaganda of its detractors.

Listen at:
http://bit.ly/SpentFuelNuclearScare

…the same kind of event which occurred just last year.

You also seem to think that TEPCO’s (who has had a very solid history of covering their own ass over the last year) seismic surveys of 4 buildings that they can’t even go inside of are bulletproof.

Tepco themselves have little to no idea what is happening under their own melted through reactors. How they could perform a comprehensive seismic survey of their damaged buildings I have no idea.

Then you reference “NUREG /CR-4982, “Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in support of Generic Safety Issue 82,” to say “Brookhaven National Laboratory, indicates that the likelihood of seismically induced spent fuel pool failure may be as low as 1 X 10-10 occurrences per reactor year, which is a statistically insignificant rate of occurrence.”

As if Brookhaven National Laboratory, in 2009, somehow simulated a 9.0 earthquake destroying a reactor building that had ALL of its active AND spent fuel rods in the cooling pond which was also blown up and their assessment of the ‘risk of seismically induced spent fuel pool failure’

….that report has no relevance to the situation whatsoever.
Assertion 1: Still exists

Assertion 2: Was the same as assertion 1

Assertion 3 is based upon on assertion 1 being bulletproof, which has already been shown to be silly.

Of course the rods aren’t going to spontaneously catch fire. As you yourself say, they’ll only catch fire if they stop getting watered. No shit.

This one had me laughing… “Further, even under the wild assumption that the buildings somehow collapsed, all of the other resources on site, and remotely off site, are still available to move in and provide cooling for the fuel.”

As if the resources on site would be able to get close enough to the collapsed radioactive mess that they’d be effective. And that’s when the fire would start.

On the cladding comment… the fuel has already completley melted the cladding in at least a couple of the reactors. Melt-through has been acknowledged by TEPCO (after months of lying about it.)

“In addition, in order for a “cataclysmic” spread of the radionuclides contained in this spent fuel to occur, we can see that a massive fire is needed to both release the material and provide a driving head (or “loft”) to spread it to the winds. It’s clear that no such fire is possible, given the above information. The assertions simply fall apart. Assertion 3: False”

It could be a fire. It could be an explosion produced by the fissioning of water due to fuel that wasn’t being cooled due to a seismic event. The fuel in spent pool 4 already caught fire once, on March 17, 2011.

Basically, your entire argument rests on the fact that such an earthquake that would destabilize these buildings is ‘impossible.’ (Already happened.) and that the things wouldn’t catch fire even if they collapsed because the cooling systems are bulletproof. (Already failed, when they were not cobbled together like so many legos in the dark.)

It seems all they have is blurry photos, “Japanese experts’ words” (they are not known inside Japan), and “TEPCO lies”. It doesn’t even look like a scientific argument, but that’s the bad meme circling the globe, constantly reinforced by the likes of Gundersen.

Had we asked about the safety of Fukushima prior to the accident, we would likely have been told it was safe, that tsunami protection was adequate and safety systems were in place. Even at the time it was obvious to many outsiders that it was not a great idea to build plants in such an active area. Now meltdowns have occurred and pollution has been released across large portions of Japan.

Given this history, many people are incredibly suspicious of any statement from the nuclear industry. Quoting Tepco safety checks saying the building is safe will not reassure; it will come across to many like standing in a titanic life raft and saying it is unsinkable!

How the two sides of this argument can come together with a degree of trust to enable the correct decisions about energy policy is not clear. There are clearly risks with nuclear power, but the alternatives aren’t pain free either.

Danger to the public can be overstated very easily, not only in this subject, but in any subject of public matter. It usually means regulations that are not useful and money spent where it has no effect. When danger is neither overstated nor understated the measures that work best can be taken. Otherwise the assessment in itself becomes a barrier to taking the best measures in a given situation.

About lessons learned, that’s not the subject of this article, so that’s a false argument here.